

FORESIGHT AFRICA

Top Priorities for the Continent in 2015



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ABOUT THE BROOKINGS AFRICA GROWTH INITIATIVE

For Africa to achieve transformative progress, policy solutions must come from African sources. The Africa Growth Initiative brings together African scholars to provide policymakers with high-quality research, expertise and innovative solutions that promote Africa's economic development. The Initiative also collaborates with research partners in the region to raise the African voice in global policy debates on Africa. Our mission is to deliver research from an African perspective that informs sound policy, creating sustained economic growth and development for the people of Africa.

Acknowledgements: The Africa Growth Initiative would like to thank Christina Golubski and Amy Copley for their instrumental role in the conceptualization, design, and production of this publication. We would also like to thank Jennifer Tyre for her work in making Foresight Africa 2015 accessible for online audiences, as well as Andrew Westbury and Neil O'Reilly for overall project direction.

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INTRODUCTION

The year 2015 will be an eventful one for the more than one billion people living in Africa. China, Africa's largest trading partner, will hold the 6th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; the Post-2015 Development Agenda will chart a new course for global responses to poverty, among other priorities for the region; West Africa will begin its recovery from the devastating Ebola crisis; and the continent's largest economy, Nigeria, will face a defining presidential election (along with more than 15 other countries). Many of these milestones will bring opportunities for Africa to re-define its relationships with global partners and strengthen its voice on the world stage. Others will present obstacles to the continent's steady march towards peace, security, and economic and human development.

Since 2010, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative has asked its scholars to assess the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. This year, AGI's experts and colleagues continue this tradition with Foresight Africa 2015, which presents a series of briefs on the critical issues and key moments for Africa over the next 12 months. It is our hope Foresight Africa 2015 will start a dialogue and ultimately support sound policy for sustained economic growth and development for the people of Africa.



The 2015 Presidential Elections in Nigeria: The Issues and Challenges
Jideofor Adibe reviews the issues, introduces the candidates and explains the complexities of the 2015 presidential election in the continent's most populous country and biggest economy.



The Sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: New Agenda and New Approach?
As the region prepares for the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, **Yun Sun** discusses the evolving China-Africa relationship, whether China's priorities might be shifting, and how African countries are strengthening their voices in the conversation.



How the West Can Do More Militarily in Africa
Michael O'Hanlon and **Amy Cooley** argue that, despite the news coverage, violence across the continent is decreasing, but to continue this trend in 2015 the international community needs to appreciate that the root causes of terrorism and intra-country conflicts extend beyond extremism.



Africa Looks Forward to the Post-2015 Development Agenda

Homi Kharas and **Julie Biau** explain the three prongs of the Post-2015 Development Agenda—job creation, infrastructure and governance, and peace and security—and what they mean for Africa.



2015: A Crucial Year for Financing Development in Africa

Amadou Sy offers recommendations for the 2015 International Conference on Financing for Development and identifies ways donors, governments, and the private sector can successfully leverage foreign direct investment for long-term growth.



An African Union for an Emerging Continent: Reforms to Increase Effectiveness

Mwangi S. Kimenyi reflects on the African Union’s successes and failures, recommending policy changes to increase its capability and influence as the institution confronts complex challenges in 2015.



Fighting Ebola: A Strategy for Action

In the midst of the ongoing Ebola crisis, **Vera Songwe** examines the long-term impacts of the epidemic and the global reaction, with an emphasis on the economic consequences and ways forward.



2015: A Pivotal Year for Obama’s Africa Legacy

Witney Schneidman appraises the White House’s current initiatives and policies toward Africa, calling for strong leadership from the president in order to deepen U.S.-Africa relations in 2015.



African Elections in 2015: A Snapshot for Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Burkina Faso and Sudan

John Mukum Mbaku gives an overview of the 2015 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Burkina Faso and Sudan, including a history of democratization in these countries, the top issues in the elections, and what to expect in 2015.

THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: THE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Jideofor Adibe, Senior Lecturer, Nasarawa State University; Editor, *African Renaissance*; Co-editor, *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*



THE PRIORITY

The 2015 presidential election in Nigeria—the fifth since 1999 when the military handed over power to elected civilians—will be the first time that the opposition will have a realistic chance of wresting power from the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). All things being equal, it will be a two-horse race between the ruling PDP and the main opposition party, the All Progressive Congress (APC)—the party formed in February 2013 from a merger of three ethnically and regionally based political parties. Before the emergence of the APC, opposition parties were mostly fragmented along regional and ethnic lines, making it impossible for them to mount a credible challenge to the ruling PDP.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

The emergence of a viable opposition coincides with a period of great tension between north and south, arising from the decision of President Goodluck Jonathan to contest the 2011 elections, a decision that has made many northerners feel cheated of their turn in producing the president and that induced some violence. With President Jonathan, a southern Christian, contesting again and very likely facing a northern Muslim candidate, the elections will have implications not just for north-south

relations but also for the survival of the country’s democracy.


Nigeria is the continent’s biggest economy and most populous country, and so instability in Nigeria could have dire economic impacts for the region. Similarly, with the number of internally displaced people from the Boko Haram conflict estimated at about 650,000 as of August 2014 (*The Guardian* 2014), a mismanaged election could trigger post-election violence that will exacerbate the refugee crisis both internally and at the regional level. For instance, it has been estimated that the Boko Haram conflict has led to more than 100,000 Nigerians seeking refuge in Niger’s Diffa region since the beginning of 2014. It is also estimated that there are 44,000 Nigerian refugees in Cameroon and 2,700 in Chad (Baiyewu 2014). Ironically, the neighboring countries where Nigerians are seeking refuge from the Boko Haram conflict are already quite poor and have severe socioeconomic challenges of their own.

Issues That Will Drive the Election

North-South, Christian-Muslim Divide

The fault lines of region, ethnicity and religion run deep in Nigeria. Virtually every part of the country has an institutionalized memory of in-

2011 Nigerian Presidential Election Results by State



Note: To win the vote, a presidential candidate must obtain an absolute majority or at least 25 percent of the ballots in two-thirds of the country's 36 states.


jury or feelings of injustice, which they often feel will be best addressed if one of their own wields power at the center, preferably as the president. Similarly, there is a pervasive fear that the president of the country will abuse the powers of his office to privilege his region, ethnicity or religion—if not to punish or deliberately disadvantage others.

To allay fears of domination, most Nigerian political parties have written or unwritten zoning and power rotation arrangements in which the parties agree that key offices and candidates should be

produced by designated sections of the country for a certain number of years. For instance, under the PDP's arrangements, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba from the southwest, served for two terms of four years before power was "returned" to the north. The north's "turn" was, however, interrupted after Obasanjo's successor, Umaru Yaradua, a Muslim from Katsina state, died in office in 2010 and was succeeded by then-Vice President Jonathan.

This result shortened the north's "turn" in power and extended the south's—frustrating

Current Nigerian Governorships by Party by State, 2014



Note: Since 2011, several parties, including the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), joined to form the All Progressive Congress (APC).

many northerners. In 2011, influential people in the north argued that Jonathan should serve out only Yaradua’s remaining first term in office and not contest those presidential elections. However, Jonathan did run and won—triggering post-election violence in the north in which an estimated 800 people lost their lives (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Jonathan’s supporters have a contrary argument. For them, in the 39 years between the time the country gained independence in 1960 and the inauguration of the Fourth

Republic in 1999, the north ruled the country for about 35 of them and should therefore be patient for that “historical injustice” to be redressed first.

North-South Regional Inequalities

Nigeria is sometimes described as a country that runs on two unequal wheels. In 2013, the Russian investment bank Renaissance Capital produced a report titled, “Nigeria Unveiled,” which painted the picture of Nigeria’s economy as moving on two wheels—a thriving south

with rising income, lower unemployment and better educated citizens, and a much poorer, less educated and struggling north (Atuanya 2013). Based on this economic imbalance, the north's dominance of power before 1999 was justified as a lever to balance the south's economic advantage. Thus, for some, since the south has held the presidency for 12 of the 15 years of civilian rule since 1999 means that the north has lost its leverage in the north-south equation.

Muhammadu Buhari—a Muslim and former military head of state with cult following in the north—was chosen as APC's presidential candidate. The election is therefore likely to witness an intense politicization of the Muslim-Christian divide and the north-south dichotomy in the country, which will add to the already existing tension in the country.

Vice Presidential Running Mate

APC strategists are banking on a combination of votes from the populous northwest (18 million votes), northeast (11 million votes) and southwest (13.5 million votes) for victory. Based on this calculation, the APC, after choosing Buhari from the northwest as its presidential candidate, also chose Professor Yemi Osinbajo, a Christian from from the southwest, as its vice presidential candidate. What remains to be seen, however, is whether Bola Tinubu—a former governor of Lagos State who played a pivotal role in the formation of the APC and is considered to be the party's strongest mobilizer in the southwest—will be very enthusiastic in delivering the battleground southwest to the APC during the elections. Tinubu indicated his interest in being the party's vice presidential candidate but being a Muslim like Buhari, the party's strategists felt that a Muslim-Muslim ticket might offend Christians and cement the PDP's labeling of the APC as an Islamic party.

Money and the Power of Incumbency

The greatest strength of the ruling PDP is its “power of incumbency,” and all the institutional support that goes with it. Not only does it have federal resources to use as patronage, it also controls key institutions like the police, the army and the anti-corruption agencies like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, which could be used to harass political enemies. Furthermore, of the 36 states in the country, the PDP has 21 governors while APC has 14. The PDP also holds comfortable majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Similarly, money plays a very important role in Nigerian politics—in campaigning, media reach and vote buying (which is a common practice in Nigerian elections). Where the voters are sufficiently animated by a certain cause, the role of money in influencing the outcome of an election will be muted. However, in places where the election is close, the role of money, especially in vote buying and other material inducements such as distribution of bags of rice, wrappers or motorcycles, will become quite important.

Jonathan's Performance in Office

Jonathan's supporters argue that—despite Boko Haram—the country is thriving: The economy continues to grow and—with the rebasing of its GDP—became the largest economy in Africa and the 26th largest in the world. Jonathan's supporters also point to his success in containing the Ebola virus, which earned him commendations from countries and institutions around the world. For his critics however, his incompetence is reflected in the high unemployment rate, which worsened from 12 percent in 2006 to 24 percent in 2011 (*Premium Times* 2013), general insecurity in the country and the deepening suspicion among the different ethnic groups. Former President Olusegun

Obasanjo in fact accused Jonathan of being a polarizing figure who promotes clannishness, “For you to allow yourself to be ‘possessed,’ so to say, to the exclusion of most of the rest of Nigerians as an ‘Ijaw man’ is a mistake that should never have been allowed to happen,” an angry Obasanjo wrote in an 18-page letter to the president (Adoyi 2013).

Opinions on Jonathan’s approach to Boko Haram vary wildly as well: His critics cite terrorism as more evidence of his incompetence. On the other hand, his supporters claim that the terrorism is actually evidence of a siege laid on his administration by powerful politicians from the Muslim north aiming for it to fail.

The Electoral Umpire

There is a consensus that the performance of the electoral umpire, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), has improved in terms of the transparency and logistics of the electoral processes under its current chairman, the northerner Professor Attahiru Jega. However, the INEC continues to be viewed with a great deal of suspicion by all sides.

The APC has many times insinuated that INEC is being manipulated by the PDP-controlled federal government. In fact, the APC declared it had lost confidence in Jega to conduct credible elections shortly after the 2013 gubernatorial elections in Anambra State, which were marred by late or non-arrival of voting materials and which was won by a party allied with the PDP (Olatunji 2013). Jega has already been accused of planning to rig the 2015 election when he suggested creating more polling booths, most of which were to be put in the north (*Nigerian Tribune* 2014).

Perceptions of the neutrality of INEC will be crucial in the acceptance of the outcome. However, if the country’s electoral history is anything to go by, the outcome of the elections will be

contentious, irrespective of the opinion of the election observers.

PDP and APC: Strengths and Weaknesses

After suffering a wave of defections to the APC last year, including five of its governors, the PDP seems to have rebounded strongly. In the battleground southwest, for instance, the party won recent governorship elections in Ekiti state and got the governor of Ondo State to defect from the Labor party to the PDP.

The party is especially strong in the south-south (where Jonathan comes from), the southeast and among Christians in the north. Again, while the PDP remains weak in the Muslim north, it has gained new influential members who decamped from the APC including the former governors of Kano State and Borno State. And, of course, the PDP has the power of incumbency.

The APC gets much of its strength from tapping into anti-Jonathan sentiments in the Muslim north and grievances among the Yoruba who feel that the Jonathan administration has ignored them in key political appointments. Allegations of corruption against top PDP officials will be powerful ammunition in the hands of the APC, especially with the choice of Buhari, widely seen as not corrupt, as the party’s presidential candidate. The party is, however, a fragile one that seems united only in its quest to wrest the presidency from Jonathan or to have power “returned” to the north. Though the election is expected to be very competitive, the odds still favor President Jonathan.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

Avoiding a Meltdown

Given the centrality of political power in Nigeria, the election—just like almost all elections in Nigeria—will be highly contentious and the

losing side is likely to blame its fate on rigging. Post-election violence is therefore likely in the north if the APC loses while renewed militancy in the restive Niger Delta is likely if Jonathan does.

A main source of concern will be if the elections become stalemated for a prolonged period or if the scale of post-election violence gets beyond a certain threshold. In these scenarios, we may have to keep an eye on some military adventurists who may be tempted to use the opportunity to cause trouble—especially if the Boko Haram challenge remains intractable.

How can the country avoid the scenario of the 2015 elections leading to the implosion of the country, given how high the stakes are? Despite several more outlandish theories that Nigeria will disintegrate in 2015, chances are that the elections will come and go and the country will remain with its political problems largely unresolved (Adibe 2014). The country is a master at teetering on the precipice: It has survived major crises, including a civil war (1967-1970). Hanging on a cliff without falling over may indeed be the country's comfort zone.

To minimize the chances of the elections leading to chaos and violence, a number of pre- and

post-election arrangements are imperative. These include updating and double checking the electoral register at least one month before the polling day. The electoral commission should also develop robust early warning systems in areas where there are likely to be logistical problems and where pre- or post-election violence are likely to occur. Credible local and international observers must be allowed to monitor the elections to ensure that the entire electoral processes are transparent. Well-trained security personnel should be deployed in volatile areas to prevent or stop outbreaks of violence.

In the longer term, Nigeria should also devise more effective strategies for dealing with the crises in its nation-building processes, which have led to virtually every section of the country feeling marginalized or alienated from the Nigeria project. The country should also continue to explore more effective means of dealing with the Boko Haram terrorism just as it needs to find the necessary political will to embark on reforms that will make the electoral processes less contentious.

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THE SIXTH FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION: NEW AGENDA AND NEW APPROACH?

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The 6th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) will be held in South Africa in 2015. This will be the first FOCAC meeting since President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013. Given China's priorities and agenda in past FOCAC meetings and the heightened importance the Xi administration has attached to Africa, expectations are that China will boost its financing commitment and development priorities in Africa at the 6th FOCAC meeting. The outcome will guide China's Africa policy for the following three years.

THE PRIORITY

China has consistently doubled its financing commitment to Africa during the past three FOCAC meetings—from \$5 billion in 2006 to \$10 billion in 2009 and \$20 billion in 2012. Half of the \$20 billion committed in 2012 had

China has consistently doubled its financing commitment to Africa during the past three FOCAC meetings.

been disbursed by the end of 2013, leading to China increasing the credit line by another \$10 billion in 2014. If this

pattern serves as any indicator, China is likely to announce another impressive line of credits available for Africa during the 6th FOCAC meeting.

The key questions are what China and Africa will prioritize the new batch of Chinese financing for and how Africa can work with China to maximize the benefits for the continent. Since its inauguration, the Xi administration has emphasized African infrastructure development. This move originates from the negative publicity and frequent criticism of China's traditional emphasis on natural resources. During his May 2014 visit of Africa, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang enthusiastically promoted major projects such as the "461 framework" on China-Africa economic cooperation¹ and the "three networks" (the high-speed rail network, the highway network and the regional aviation network). Many of these plans will materialize or expand during the 6th FOCAC meeting.

Despite the supposedly cooperative nature of FOCAC, China has played a larger role in setting and driving the agenda in the past as the financier of the projects. Africa's priorities in

¹ "461" is a cooperation framework proposed by China that includes four principles "equality, solidarity/mutual trust, tolerance in development issues, innovative cooperation," six major projects "industrial cooperation, financial cooperation, poverty alleviation cooperation, environmental protection cooperation, civil and cultural exchanges cooperation, peace and security cooperation, and one platform 'FOCAC.'"

structural reform and capacity building are important, but at times have been regarded as secondary for China under the broader framework of “mutually beneficial” cooperation. Since its inauguration, however, the Xi administration has enhanced its emphasis in the areas in which Africa is most interested. This decision partially reflects China’s desire to mitigate the broad criticisms on its “mercantilist” approach toward Africa, Xi’s economic charm offensive to boost China’s contribution in international development, and rising African demands. The 6th FOCAC meeting, therefore, will possibly witness an elevated devotion on Beijing’s part towards those areas, including agricultural development, industrialization, training, job creation and technology transfer through investment in manufacturing industries. In addition, necessitated by China’s rising investment in Africa and the local security risks associated with them, peace and stability are likely to be key areas for discussion at the 6th FOCAC meeting.

The 6th FOCAC meeting, therefore, will possibly witness an elevated devotion on Beijing’s part towards [African priorities], including agricultural development, industrialization, training, job creation and technology transfer through investment in manufacturing industries.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

As Africa’s largest trading partner and a major investor, China’s actions have major implications for the development of the continent. Thus, Africa needs to accurately anticipate and assess the Chinese agenda, weighing the pros and cons, in order to approach FOCAC with strategies and priorities that will align with that agenda but also meet African needs. For example, agricultural transformation has been a main priority for Africans in

order to enhance productivity, food security and inclusive development. In addition, industrial investments are greatly needed to achieve structural transformation and diversify Africa’s production and export base. Given the importance of these issues, African countries should negotiate with China for direct investment in these areas.

China’s response most likely will be that its investment in infrastructure will lay the necessary foundation for both Africa’s agricultural transformation and industrial development. However, the key question here is whether such infrastructure deals will bog African countries back down to reliance on natural resources transactions and undermine the momentum for structural reform. The Chinese model of infrastructure development in Africa features resources-backed loans and tied aid to create business opportunities for Chinese importers and contractors. While it may contribute to the infrastructure needed for economic development, this emphasis does not address Africa’s most urgent needs in agricultural transformation, economic structural reform or human resources capacity building.

Despite the hope that Beijing will contribute more to areas such as agricultural and industrial development, observers of China-Africa relations are concerned that the majority of the new financing committed by China in 2014 or those to be announced in 2015 at the 6th FOCAC meeting will follow the traditional trajectory. In fact, according to China’s former special envoy for African affairs, China has no intention of breaking away from this old pattern. Commenting on the \$10 billion China offered in 2014, the special envoy pointed out that “this funding will be paid back by African countries with commodities or the franchise [of the infrastructure projects]” (Shang 2014). Meanwhile, although Beijing has imposed more stringent requirements on Chinese companies in order to improve the companies’ records on governance,

transparency and accountability when investing in Africa, few Chinese expect them to completely abandon their sub-optimal operation model in the near future. Some Chinese experts have pointed out that private Chinese investors make up about 80 percent of all Chinese entities investing in Africa and, due to their own deficiencies, are less adaptive to the African context (Liu 2013). If African governments deem these approaches undesirable, they need to work and negotiate for a change of rules and practices. In particular, African regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) should play the important role in pushing China as well as African countries to sign international agreements on transparency especially in the natural resource extraction industry, including the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative.

China's recent and rising interests in African security affairs could bring more resources and assistance to the table in terms of stabilization and conflict resolution in Africa. China has adjusted its principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs in cases such as South Sudan, and has enhanced its military assistance to and security cooperation with African countries and regional organizations. For example, China is scheduled to send an infantry battalion—the largest combat troop contribution China has made to a U.N. peacekeeping mission—to South Sudan in the beginning of 2015. While China's contribution to African security issues could be positive, Africa needs to understand and prepare for the potential geopolitical implications—most likely, a heightened sense of competition between China and Western powers if China's political influence and security presence in Africa are to expand.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

During past FOCAC summits, China has largely set the agenda for the meetings. To level the playing field African leaders need to carefully strategize and actively voice their demands for

China's contribution according to their own needs. They should coordinate their goals and strategies to leverage collective bargaining and binding power vis-à-vis China through regional and sub-regional organizations. The African Union has played a key role harmonizing the positions and development agendas among African countries: Now is the perfect opportunity for the AU to spearhead discussions with China on how African agendas are incorporated in China's planned activities in the continent.

As noted above, it remains to be seen whether China will abandon its traditional financing model backed by African resources despite its new emphasis on African demands. African leaders therefore must aim for a more informed understanding of the short-term and long-term consequences of Chinese financing projects. As most African countries prioritize structural transformation as the central and most critical theme in their economic policies, they have to develop a nuanced assessment of how China's infrastructure financing will contribute or undermine this theme and actively manage the results.

China has stated a willingness to enhance and improve its input in African capacity building, such as human resources development, technical assistance and technological transfers. The commitment indeed presents an opportunity for African countries to wisely strategize and demand China deliver the investments they need most, including on manufacturing industries and job creation. Africa should not stop with China's piecemeal approach and demonstration projects crafted for public relations purposes. For example, the corporate social responsibility programs operated by Chinese companies are "passive" rather than "active." They are motivated by "executive directives" by Chinese government agencies and "neglect the public relations campaign" (Wang 2014). Instead, Africans should design their own capacity building project guidelines aimed at structural transformation in a comprehensive manner.

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HOW THE WEST CAN DO MORE MILITARILY IN AFRICA

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THE PRIORITY

In 2015, new and precarious security challenges face the African continent: Elections loom in Nigeria as well as in at least 10 other African countries, raising prospects of electoral violence, while internal political fights in Libya, among others, rage on. Violent extremism has also become a persistent threat, from the tragic attacks in 2013 on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and multiple assaults on Kenya’s coastal region by al-Shabab, to the kidnap of over 200 Chibok schoolgirls and slew of bombings in Nigeria by Boko Haram throughout 2014.

These instances of violence undermine the region’s dramatic economic growth, slow or even halt investment, jeopardize the welfare of its citizens, contribute to famine, create regional instability, and destabilize governments and public institutions. They also threaten Western interests by fostering instability that enables the spread of extremism, with the “underwear bomber” of Nigerian origin in 2009 serving as an early warning sign of what could emerge from the region. Yet extremist violence is only one dynamic among the multitude of factors influencing the security landscape of the continent. Recent highlights and trends in violent conflict in Africa, beyond the headlines noted above, include the following:

- A serious civil war in the Central African Republic fought largely along Muslim-Christian lines led to the deployment of first an African Union force and now a United Nations force, with a modest calming of a situation that nonetheless still remains quite fraught.
- Violence between and within the two Sudans remains serious and incendiary, though perhaps somewhat less intense as 2014 concludes than at many other points in the last decade.
- Somalia is trending favorably, with ongoing and generally successful counter offensives by the African Union (largely made up of Ugandan, Kenyan, Ethiopian and Burundian troops) against al-Shabab in recent months, though spillover effects into Kenya in particular remain very worrisome.
- The swath of land in northwestern Africa running from Libya through Mali to Nigeria and now Cameroon remains unstable and linked by overlapping rebel movements, with Mali doing somewhat better but Libya increasingly threatened.
- The conflict in the Congo has largely stalemated, with a stronger position for government and United Nations forces than in past years in the country’s troubled east, but the area is still a far cry from stable.

While Africa is clearly faced by many and diverse violent conflicts, it is making some key improvements. In fact, reflecting on the developments in 2014, it is clear that the challenges for 2015 are not necessarily in responding to cataclysmic situations, but in building on its recent peacekeeping progress—for example, in Somalia, where AU forces have cleared al-Shabab insurgents from Mogadishu and other strategic areas. With the development and strengthening of African Union forces, especially the full implementation of the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF) in 2015, the AU will be capable of targeting acute threats in specific places, precluding an escalation to more serious and widespread forms of conflict. Peacebuilding interventions by regional organizations such as

In fact, reflecting on the developments in 2014, it is clear that the challenges for 2015 are not necessarily in responding to cataclysmic situations, but in building on its recent peacekeeping progress.

the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in South Sudan also hold promise for more African solutions to African problems, often legitimizing interventions and making resolutions more acceptable to the parties involved.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

As noted above, extremism is just one factor contributing to some of the myriad of violent conflicts on the continent. Many conflicts in Africa have stemmed from longstanding issues of political, economic and social marginalization as well as systemic inequalities and historical grievances between identity groups. In addition, weak institutions fail to protect individuals and preserve the rule of law while widespread poverty leaves many citizens without hope and feeling they have little resort but violence. Increasingly, we are seeing dictators attempting

to manipulate political systems to extend their stays in power, inflaming tensions with desperate citizens whose uprisings could turn violent, as seen in Burkina Faso in October 2014.

Weak institutions fail to protect individuals and preserve the rule of law while widespread poverty leaves many citizens without hope and feeling they have little resort but violence.

Thus, the common Western belief that what is most important in Africa is the threat from extremist groups like Boko Haram, al-Shabab, and the militias and terrorists that have plagued Mali and nearby countries simplifies complex relationships and conflicts into “good guys” versus “bad guys.” In doing so, it obscures the dynamics of the conflicts—the diverse stakeholders and their varying motives for perpetuating violence—as well as potential entry points for military and diplomatic intervention. We clearly cannot view the issue of violence in Africa solely through the lens of transnational violent extremism, especially from what might be termed “al-Qaida’ism”: Salafist or takfiri movements claiming Islam as their ideology but in fact perverting and wrongly impugning that great religion.

We must look beyond the headlines and engage Africans in the way they tend to view the issue of violence. Thus, one must broaden the aperture beyond that of the so-called global jihad, and, indeed, even beyond civil and regional conflict to the subject of crime and organized violence.

Taking a broader perspective is not only the more diplomatic approach, but also the more promising way to build cooperative relationships with African states that define their security threats much more broadly than Westerners may appreciate.

Many good things are happening in Africa. Civil warfare on balance is down from levels of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, with estimated annual death rates half or less of what they once were (Cilliers 2014; Human Security Report Project 2013). Democracy is spreading, as are strong economic trends, with about half the continent's nations enjoying favorable developments in both democratic governance and economic growth.

Africans are also taking charge of their own security much more than ever before. The positive developments in Somalia are a case in point. The African Union has committed itself to creating an African Standby Military Force in 2015 to more rapidly address conflict situations and reduce immediate reliance on external actors, such as the United States and France. And the United States may be modestly upgrading its own engagement with the continent through capacity building programs for African militaries and civilian security forces—such as the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (A-Prep) and Security Governance Initiative (SGI) programs which were promised by the Obama administration at the 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

In light of these developments, African governments and organizations should prioritize the following in their 2015 security agenda:

- A fully operational African Standby Force that would enable the AU to respond to localized crises that might balloon into more serious conflicts or are perpetuating existing conflicts.

In addition we also would propose three main lines of effort for the United States and like-minded states in 2015:

- Building on President Obama's acknowledgement that the Libya effort has not turned out well, a much more intensive international effort to help train and outfit a national police force and a national army should be enacted.
- The U.S. and others should create sustained, high-level engagement with Nigeria's various political actors so that the dynamics leading up to the 2015 election do not worsen regional and sectarian schisms that may provide some of the disaffection among many citizens that Boko Haram can then exploit. American military and intelligence support for the Nigerian state should increase in targeted areas, too. (For more on the upcoming Nigerian elections, see **"The 2015 Presidential Elections in Nigeria: The Issues and Challenges."**)
- With U.S. forces downsizing dramatically in Afghanistan (even if increasing their role modestly in Iraq and Syria), the United States could consider sending what is now known as a Security Force Assistance Brigade to the Congo to undergird the U.N. effort there and begin the process of making the Congolese armed forces truly capable of handling more of the nation's internal security challenges than they are now able to muster.

With some targeted and generally modest investments, the United States and other key nations can help African states build on what is, in reality, a more promising security environment than many appreciate, with numerous hopeful signs. Building on partial success is often easier than rescuing a completely failed effort from disaster, so we should remember what is going well on the continent and not just which violent extremist acts grab the international headlines.

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AFRICA LOOKS FORWARD TO THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

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THE PRIORITY

The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) era has seen a transformation in the African development narrative. Africa's prospects in 2015 are markedly different from what they were in 2000: African economies have grown at rates rivalling those of East Asia, averaging 6 percent in 2013 (excluding South Africa) (Africa Progress Panel 2014). By 2025, if current growth trajectories continue, three out of every five African countries will be middle income. Moreover, this growth has been driven both by natural resources and by a vibrant services sector, rising private investment, increased exports and improved agricultural production. Africa is increasingly depicted by its leaders as a continent of opportunity.


The region's performance on individual well-being, however, as measured by the MDGs, contrasts with this glowing image. Since 2000, Africa has lagged behind the rest of the world on MDG progress, particularly in terms of poverty, job creation and food security (UNDP 2013) (see Figure 1). Recent reports¹ note that Africa's structural transformation has been limited, with little impact on the lives of the poorest

(Africa Progress Panel 2014). The World Bank's 2014 *Global Monitoring Report* estimates that sub-Saharan Africa is home to 41 percent of today's global poor, a share that could reach 81 percent by 2030 under a business-as-usual scenario. This stark concentration of global poverty demands a focused response from African governments.

In September 2015, the United Nations member states will decide on the sustainable development goals that will replace the MDGs and guide the global development agenda until 2030. Encouragingly, the Common African Position (CAP) on these goals, agreed upon by the African Union in January 2014, places emphasis on "structural transformation for inclusive and people-centered development," (African Union 2014). Operationalizing this vision will entail investing further in infrastructure, basic services and job creation, as well as going beyond the scope of the MDGs to address the difficult questions of peace, security and governance (World Bank 2014a). African governments should use the coming year to implement bold policy measures in these areas, so as to secure a central place for inclusive growth on the post-2015 agenda.

¹ These include the 2014 African Transformation Report, the African Union's Agenda 2063, the African Development Bank's long-term strategy, the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa's 2013 report, and UNCTAD's 2012 report on structural transformation and sustainable development in Africa.

FIGURE 1



Note: A value of 100 percent means that the respective MDG has been reached. "Latest available value" denotes current progress as illustrated by the most recent available data: extreme poverty, 2010; primary completion rate, total, 2011; ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education, 2011; mortality rate, infants, 2013; mortality rate, children under 5, 2013; maternal mortality ratio, 2010; improved water source, 2010; improved sanitation facilities, 2010.

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the World Development Indicators database.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?


Three New Prongs of the Post-2015 Agenda

Compared to the MDGs' focus on basic needs, the post-2015 agenda has three new prongs that are critical to development success in Africa and that are incorporated in the six pillars of the CAP.

Job creation. Recent growth in Africa has not created enough good jobs: In the past decade, Africa's labor force grew by 91 million people, but only 37 million of these were in jobs in wage-paying sectors (UNDP 2013). This lag is posing a societal challenge, especially with the expansion of the continent's working-age population amidst growing youth unemployment.

The post-2015 agenda must ensure that Africa's structural transformation leads to job creation where productivity is higher than in informal agriculture. There are compelling reasons to focus on all sectors. Prioritizing agriculture is a *sine qua non* for eradicating poverty, as farming is a source of livelihood for 78 percent of Africa's extreme poor; manufacturing has traditionally been an "escalator" to economic growth, with a large literature suggesting that productivity convergence is easier to achieve in manufacturing than elsewhere (Rodrik 2013); and the recent African growth successes have been driven by the expansion of a dynamic service sector, mostly in telecommunications, retail, transportation and tourism, which accounted for 62 percent of cumulative GDP growth between 1995 and 2011 (World Bank 2014b). Achieving enough job creation to make growth inclusive and to

FIGURE 2



Note: Industry comprises manufacturing and other industry.
Source: World Bank.

reduce poverty will require African governments to address binding constraints in all three sectors.

Infrastructure and governance. African infrastructure in transport, power, irrigation, storage and other areas is underdeveloped. Addressing it will require a larger pipeline of projects, better governance to encourage the entry of private long-term investors, and new financing: The estimated financing gap for infrastructure is about \$48 billion per year. The Africa50 Fund, established by the African Development Bank, is an example of the new kind of facility that is needed to provide technical expertise, early stage capital, and dedicated project teams to accelerate the financial close of infrastructure projects. But improved project facilities will not be sufficient. By and large, Africa has not achieved the kind of governance improvements needed to deliver, operate and maintain better infrastructure. Lingering gaps in rule of law and persistent corruption continue to constrain private investment. Likewise, while access to most basic services improved during the MDG period, there are gaping disparities between urban and rural areas and between income groups. A more inclusive

approach to infrastructure will entail tackling delicate issues not addressed by the MDGs, such as property rights, discrimination and corruption.

Peace and security. Twenty-four countries in sub-Saharan Africa have extreme poverty rates exceeding 40 percent, of which 18 are listed by the OECD as fragile states (World Bank 2014c). This implies that in order to eradicate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, there needs to be a strong push to invest in peace, security and institutional reform. As highlighted by the High-Level Panel report on the post-2015 agenda, this is a “fundamental shift—to recognize peace and good governance as core elements of well-being, not optional extras,” (United Nations 2013). The Common African Position also includes peace and security as a pillar, but this is currently the least developed part of its action plan. Operationalizing it will require both donors and governments to go outside their comfort zones.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

African governments can still accelerate progress towards the MDGs during 2015. Even if goals are not fully met, the MDGs are the starting point for the post-2015 agenda, and every effort must be made to strengthen these foundations by the end of the year. Drawing lessons from implementation of the MDGs can be instructive in discovering how best to use a global goal-setting framework to support national development.

In 2015, the debate will shift towards financing, means of implementation and accountability for results. The year provides a window of opportunity for African governments that have already signaled their willingness to take on and own politically sensitive issues in the context of the CAP, to now develop a strong regional vision for monitoring and accountability, with clear plans for financing and implementation strategies at the country level.

One important milestone is the upcoming third International Conference on Financing for Development, to be held in Addis Ababa, July 13-16, 2015. (For more on financing for development in Africa, see **“2015: A Crucial Year for Financing Development in Africa.”**) This conference is an opportunity to realize three key outcomes: (i) a reaffirmation of strong official development support to least developed and post-conflict countries, despite the budget pressures in many developed countries, and perhaps through a reallocation of grant aid from middle-income to low-income countries; (ii) an increased level of support for the financing needs of low- and lower-middle-income countries, especially for big-ticket national and regional infrastructure support; and (iii) a common understanding of the positive role that business—local and multinational, large and small—can play in achieving sustainable development, and the policies, regulations and incentives that will maximize business’ contribution to development consistently with their incentive to maximize long-term profits.

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2015: A CRUCIAL YEAR FOR FINANCING DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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THE PRIORITY

Achieving the 17 sustainable development goals set at the Rio+20 Conference (2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development) will require an effective sustainable development financing strategy. In fact, in 2015, world leaders will meet in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the third International Conference on Financing for Development. The conference will focus on (i) assessing the progress made in the implementation of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and the 2008 Doha Declaration on Financing for Development; (ii) addressing new and emerging issues; and (iii) reinvigorating and strengthening the financing for development follow-up process. In preparation for the Addis Ababa meetings, the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, a United Nations group tasked with following up on member states' commitments, has proposed a number of options for a financing strategy, with a focus on domestic and international, public, private and blended resources.

The Addis Ababa conference is timely as the context for African countries has changed considerably in the 12 years since Monterrey. Public domestic resources have increased thanks to debt relief, better revenue collection and gains from the commodity price boom. However, tax

mobilization remains low in spite of significant efforts and recent reforms in many countries. Private international flows, especially foreign direct investment and portfolio flows to African countries, have also increased since Monterrey. Before 2006, only South Africa had issued a foreign-currency denominated sovereign bond in sub-Saharan Africa. Now, 12 other countries have issued a total of \$15 billion in international sovereign bonds. On the other hand, domestic private financing remains limited as most African capital markets continue to be small, and banks dominate the financial system. International public flows to Africa are slowing down as official development assistance (ODA) declines. This shift has caused many to consider how aid dollars might be used to catalyze private investment, forming “blended” development financing. At the same time, China and other emerging market countries are playing an increasingly important role in financing African infrastructure and other investments. Financing for development, a vision conceptualized in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and the 2008 Doha Declaration, suggests that governments should focus on policies that increase and improve the quality of finance from domestic and international partners, through public, private and blended finance. Therefore, foreign direct investment—considered “stable, patient money”—should receive more attention than private capital flows, which provide unstable “hot”

money. In addition, governments should aim to foster inclusive, sustainable growth through financial flows by creating policies that better link skills and technology transfer to financing. Clearly, in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) “more and better financing for development will be needed” (Sy 2013a). (For more on the SDGs, see **“Africa Looks Forward to the Post-2015 Development Agenda.”**)

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

Quantifying needs is a difficult exercise, but the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing estimates that the cost of a global safety net to eradicate extreme poverty in all countries is about \$66 billion annually and that annual investment requirements in infrastructure—water, agriculture, telecoms, power, transport, buildings, industrial and forestry sectors, etc.—amount to \$5 trillion to \$7 trillion globally. The unmet need for credit for small and medium enterprises has been estimated to be up to \$2.5 trillion in developing countries (United Nations 2014a). There are also large financing needs for the provision of global public goods to make investments “climate-compatible.” Although data on financing needs specific to African countries are not readily available, it is clear that they are disproportionately large relative to the size of their economies, especially for landlocked as well as post-conflict countries.

Current models of finance for development focus on two complementary questions: (1) how to raise *more* finance and (2) how to attract *better* finance (Sy 2013b).

The more finance argument: Domestic resources provide the bulk of sustainable development finance. Thus strengthening tax systems, expanding domestic tax bases and enhancing local financial markets, as recommended by the United Nations High-Level Panel on the

Post-2015 Development Agenda, should continue to be a top priority for African governments. Yet, domestic revenues are only part of the solution and cannot provide all of the necessary resources for meeting the SDGs. Official development assistance, private capital flows (foreign direct investment, portfolio and loan flows), remittances and other forms of external flows will also be essential as a complement to domestic financing.


The better finance argument: The volatility and short-term nature of external capital flows present risks to African countries. However, these risks can be mitigated by prioritizing more stable and long-term finance from sovereign wealth funds, private companies, and development finance institutions.

While improving the quality and quantity of finance will be crucial for African governments, it will also be integral for them to optimize the use of their resources so that they get the most value for money as they work toward meeting the SDGs. For instance, attracting more finance into enclave sectors such as extractive industries that do not create jobs may be less useful in achieving the SDGs compared to financing agribusiness or manufacturing industries (assuming that the revenues from extractive industries are not used for pro-employment policies as is often the case).

Where Do We Stand 12 Years after Monterrey?

Analysis of financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa since the 2002 Monterrey Consensus indicates that financing to the region has increased in quality and quantity over the past decade. Gross private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa have surpassed official development assistance, growing by 19.4 percent per year (see Figure 1). Stable, long-term foreign direct investment (FDI) now comprises 75 percent of total private capital flows, making it the major

FIGURE 1



Source: IMF 2014.


“engine of external finance” to sub-Saharan Africa (Sy 2013a).

In 2010, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries contributed 25 percent of sub-Saharan African FDI, and their share is growing. Similarly, portfolio flows have experienced explosive growth in recent years, jumping from negligible levels in 2002, to an average of \$9.5 billion over the past decade (IMF 2014).

Yet, despite these gains in more stable forms of financing, these investments are still highly concentrated geographically and sectorally, with approximately three-quarters of investments over the last decade destined for resource-rich countries and extractive industries (see Figure 2). Recent discoveries of natural resources foreshadow additional growth in these sectors. However, considering the tenuous links between extractive industries and domestic financial systems, it is unclear whether this growth will provide benefits to local firms and employment markets.

ODA is not increasing all that much but there is growing interest in the use of aid to support and work with the private sector, including from the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Canada and others. Whether this approach will deliver results remains unclear. The G-8 pledge at Gleneagles in 2005 to increase aid by \$50 billion by 2010 (half of which destined for Africa) has not materialized. Aid increased by \$30 billion and only \$11 billion went to Africa. More recently, aid to the continent fell from 2012 to 2013, and the latest forecasts indicate that it is falling further. In contrast, aid from countries that are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is almost certainly trending up driven by China. ODA, whether from OECD or non-OECD countries, will remain an important source of finance for least developed and post-conflict countries. Remittances from non-resident Africans have averaged \$21.8 billion over the decade with some countries such as Nigeria and Senegal receiving about 10 percent of GDP in remittance flows. Again, countries with a large population of African migrants can play an important role in supporting remittances as a catalyst for job

FIGURE 2



Source: IMF 2014.

creation and investment. Illicit financial flows, on the other hand, can be highly detrimental to development efforts. Precise figures on illicit flows are difficult to capture, but estimates suggest that they may have been twice as important as ODA (Africa Progress Panel 2013). A concerted international effort to reduce such flows and make up for the lost fiscal revenues could free up more resources for African governments to invest in job creation and skills development.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

In sum, next year in Addis Ababa, African and world leaders must not only seek more and better finance, but also more value for money if they are to support sustainable, inclusive development in the most efficient way. Initiatives such as U.N. Global Compact can serve as a platform for governments to engage with the private sector and discuss how best to mobilize finance to achieve the SDGs.

African governments can better extract benefits from financial resources when they partner

with foreign governments. For instance, the U.N. High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda recommends to infuse global partnerships and cooperation into all the SDGs.

To harness financial flows for long-term economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, African policymakers will need to foster linkages between multinational companies and the domestic private sector, specifically facilitating the transfer of knowledge and skills to the region. In the near term, African governments can incentivize investors to integrate local businesses into their value chains and to help provide educational, training and employment opportunities to local workers. Several companies in the information, communications and technology sector, including Google, Microsoft, and Huawei have already implemented programs to train youth in Kenya and other countries. Furthermore, developing local content legislation that promotes the SDGs will require a flexible and strategic view from policymakers. They can also, in the medium to long term, formulate commercial strategies around the type of FDI their countries anticipate attracting and then develop the technologies and skills that will be necessary for the expected investments.

It will also be important to think carefully about the role aid donors can play in supporting job creation and skills acquisition while also addressing sectors that private sector investment typically neglects. For instance, ODA complements other sources of finance when it comes to the infrastructure sector. Indeed, while the private sector has primarily financed the information and communications technology sector and (more recently) the energy sector, it does not focus much on the transportation and water sectors, where ODA funding is more important. Even in the energy sector, ODA can help leverage more private financing as illustrated by the United States' Power Africa initiative where \$7 billion of public funding has so far leveraged \$20 billion of private sector money, from both

U.S. and African corporates. As global policy leaders are framing the agenda on climate finance with \$20 billion pledged for the Green Climate Fund, it will be important for African leaders to ensure that the new global priorities on climate finance are consistent with the continent's sustainable development agenda.

Finally, the focus on finance should not divert policymakers' attention from measures to reduce existing efficiency losses through better governance and other measures. For instance, the estimated spending required to address Africa's infrastructure needs is approximately \$93 billion per year, 40 percent of which should be used to bolster the power sector, according to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD). African governments, supported in part by international donors and private sector actors, already spend about \$45 billion annually on infrastructure. Nearly two-thirds of these expenditures are used for existing infrastructure operations and maintenance while one-third funds new projects. This leaves a financing gap of \$48 billion and begs the question of how to finance this amount (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010).

A first step to reduce the financing gap is to more efficiently use existing infrastructure. Indeed, rectifying inefficiencies in existing infrastructure, improving subsidies and enhancing budget execution, can reduce the financing gap by \$17 billion, from \$48 to \$31 billion a year and have a significant impact on African power sectors.

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AN AFRICAN UNION FOR AN EMERGING CONTINENT: REFORMS TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS

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THE PRIORITY

Late in 2014, as the Ebola crisis escalated, a popular African newspaper carried an opinion piece entitled, “Where is Africa?” (Ndemo 2014). This question was in reference to the fact that the African Union (AU)—which was expected by many Africans to lead the effort against the epidemic—was missing in action. The author suggested that the AU should have immediately called for an “Ebola Summit” to discuss the crisis and find ways to deal fully and effectively with it. Instead, the AU was absent and left the job to governments and organizations from outside the continent. (For more on the Ebola epidemic see **“Fighting Ebola: A Strategy for Action.”**) In the case of other African crises during the last several years, the AU has behaved similarly—it

In the case of other African crises during the last several years, the AU has failed to lead or even function as a relevant party in their resolution. At other times, the AU has been willing to act, but has been too slow in taking action.

has failed to lead or even function as a relevant party in their resolution. At other times, the AU has been willing to act, but has been too slow in taking action.

Besides addressing crises, the AU is also charged

with the responsibility of coordinating continent-wide development efforts and serving as the voice of Africans in matters of global governance. Tackling the most pressing issues on the continent—including accelerating “the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;” helping “promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;” promoting “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and governance;” and promoting “peace, security, and stability on the continent”—calls for the participation of a supranational organization such as the African Union (African Union 2000). Increasingly, however, observers both in and outside the continent are noting that the AU is either not willing or not capable of carrying out its objectives effectively.

A well-functioning and effective AU is crucial to the social, political and economic advancement of Africa. For a continent comprised of 54 countries that vary widely in terms of land size, population, ethnic and religious diversity, and levels of development, the organization that is expected to serve as the primary centralized coordinating institution in uniting Africans in advancing their joint welfare and enhancing their peaceful co-existence must be one that (1) fully understands and appreciates the multifarious problems that currently confront the continent; and (2) has the capacity to carry out

the required policies and also has the legal authority to do so.

Of course, the AU cannot function effectively if it is pervaded by incompetence, limited resources, corruption and other bureaucratic inefficiencies. Thus, the key to making the AU a successful instrument and powerful voice is reconstructing and reconstituting both the institution and its organs so as to create a political and bureaucratic institution that functions according to the rule of law and serves as a true representative of the wishes and aspirations of the broad cross-section of African people. It is only such an efficiently run organization that can deal effectively with the multifarious problems that currently plague the continent.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

The Organization of African Unity: The Need for One African Voice

The desire to unite Africans under a centralized institution has been an important goal of Africans, dating back to the years during which they fought the European colonialists for independence. The most important development in the effort to unite the continent came with the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on January 25, 1963. The OAU was expected to serve as an instrument or mechanism for forging unity and solidarity among African states. It was also expected to advance cooperation among countries in order to enhance and promote economic development, improve the quality of life of all Africans, encourage and make possible the peaceful settlement of disputes, expand inter-country trade, and advance democracy. An important core mandate of the OAU was that it fight to eliminate any vestiges of colonialism on the continent, including South

Africa's race-based apartheid system. The 1991 Abuja Treaty, which aimed to create an African Economic Community through a gradual process with full political and economic integration, significantly expanded the mandate of the OAU.

Unfortunately, the OAU failed to undertake or accomplish many of these important tasks, especially promoting and institutionalizing democracy. In fact, from the late 1950s to the early 1990s, the continent was pervaded by military dictatorships, single-party regimes, and generally governments that were unaccountable to the people, highly corrupt, and acted with impunity. Thus, the OAU, which came to be considered by many observers as a "club of dictators," lacked the moral standing to serve as an effective voice for Africa.

In addition, the OAU was unable to perform its function as the continent's peacemaker—its charter's stipulation of non-interference with the internal affairs of other countries limited the ability of national governments to intervene when it was determined that state- or non-state actors in member states were committing atrocities, for example, against innocent civilians. The consequences of this inactivity on the part of the OAU were serious violations of human rights, exploitation of vulnerable groups, and many cases of ethnic cleansing. Examples include the failure of the OAU to intervene and stop the violent activities of dictators such as Idi Amin (Uganda), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire/DRC), Muammar Gaddafi (Libya), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), and Sargent Samuel Kanyon Doe (Liberia). Perhaps, most glaring is the failure of the OAU to effectively and timely prevent the massacre of Tutsis and their supporters in Rwanda in 1994. Due to its many challenges, the OAU was dissolved in 2002 and replaced by the African Union,¹ which was founded on a revised

¹ Morocco is the only African country is not a member of the African Union—in 1984, Morocco officially withdrew from the OAU to protest the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The SADR claims sovereignty over all of the Western Sahara, which Morocco believes and argues is part of its territory. Although South Sudan was admitted as the 54th member of the African Union shortly after it gained its independence in 2011, it has yet to sign and ratify the Constitutive Act.

charter addressing the weaknesses of the OAU, but carrying on its major goals. Unfortunately, the AU seems to have inherited the OAU's approach to the performance of its functions as evidenced by the failure of the organization to effectively and timely spearhead the peaceful resolution of destructive conflicts in South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali.

Economic Development

On the development side, although the AU has produced and disseminated relatively elaborate and well-defined policy initiatives (e.g., New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD), for the alleviation of poverty and the empowerment of women, among others, the implementation of these plans has been quite poor. The AU has recently formulated a long-term development plan dubbed "Africa 2063: Unity, Prosperity and Peace," which outlines a strategy to guide the continent's development for the next 50 years. Unfortunately, even after a decade of the AU's existence, poverty remains widespread throughout the continent, women continue to be oppressed and exploited, and Africa remains at the periphery of both the global economy and the international governance system. These failures are directly related to a number of factors, including low financing, weak leadership organs and limited genuine representation of the general public.

Regional Integration

The AU is expected to spearhead the continent's regional integration effort and help provide viable regional integration units, which could serve as mechanisms for cooperation in investment, provision of infrastructure, management of the environment, and growth and development. Unfortunately, in reality, it is unlikely that the proposed Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)—a carryover from the Abuja Treaty—will come to fruition by 2016 because a large number of issues at the regional economic

community level remain unresolved. While several regional integration units do exist in the continent today (e.g., East African Community (ECA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among others), many have not provided the necessary enabling environments for greater cooperation and trade. As a result, trade among members has not increased significantly. Perhaps more important is the fact that some of the protocols establishing regional economic communities have not yet been implemented, which is in part failure of the AU as it is tasked with coordinating and working with regional economic communities in expediting the implementation of various integration plans. By and large, many of the key development proposals remain statements of intent and lack actual implementation. It is for this reason that some observers have referred to the AU as a "talk shop" (Essa 2013).

The Post-2015 Agenda

Some of the key development issues that the AU is expected to spearhead in 2015 include presenting a coherent African position on the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals. Here, the AU needs to push for goals that reflect the actual needs of Africans. Although the African Union has already released its Common Africa Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda that includes its own vision for 29 Sustainable Development Goals, AU negotiators must participate fully and effectively in the talks at the U.N. so that the African platform is given a proper hearing. (For more on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, see **"Africa Looks Forward to the Post-2015 Development Agenda."**) To successfully enhance the African agenda, the AU needs strong leadership and well-qualified technical staff—two things that critics have argued the body lacks. In addition, to amplify the African voice, many people inside the continent have called on the AU to narrow down the scope of the AU's goals to focus on those that affect the largest number

of Africans, are Africa-specific (and hence, are unlikely to be lobbied for by other countries), and are least likely to be vetoed (Carin 2014).

Peace and Security

Africa still suffers from violent mobilization by various ethnic and religious groups. However, the AU—despite the fact that, unlike the OAU, it has the mandate to intervene in these crises—has been unable to deal directly with this violence, as seen in intractable civil conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan, as well as the increasing threat of terrorism by groups such as Boko Haram, al-Shabab, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although there have been some notable successes such as in the case of Somalia, the failures stand out. In many respects, the AU has either been extremely slow to intervene in various conflicts in the continent or has done so ineffectively. In fact, the African Union effort in Central African Republic (MISCA—*Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine*) was considered a total failure. These short-term missions have not been the only disappointments: The launch of the African Standby Force has already been delayed several times, even though it was expected to have been established and made operational by 2010—largely due to limited resources from the member countries. An additional obstacle to the AU’s efforts to bolster peace lies at the Heads of States level as they are expected to provide guidance on such matters.

Good Governance and Corruption

The AU has played and continues to play an important role in bringing about improvements in domestic good governance, accountability and transparency. It is empowered to impose sanctions in cases of non-democratic transitions of power or where parties to conflicts refuse to en-

ter into negotiations to resolve disputes—as it threatened to do in the recent events in Burkina Faso. The AU has also been involved in matters of management of natural resource wealth and especially in pushing for member countries to sign international protocols that deal with corrupt practices. The AU took another step toward addressing these issues at its June 2014 summit when leaders amended the protocol of the African Court on Justice and Human Rights, allowing the group authority over “...corruption, money-laundering, human and drug trafficking, and piracy...” (Allison 2014). However, the AU’s progress on these matters has generally been incredibly slow—and in a few cases nonexistent and even regressive. In several countries, executives have manipulated national constitutions in order to extend their stay in power, and, in doing so, have caused political regression. In addition, although elections have become the norm, many of them are marred by chaos, vote theft and rigging, intimidation of opposition leaders, and violence. The AU does not appear to have a clear strategy to deal with erosion of democracy and has not been fully prepared to play the crucial role of helping prepare the electorate in each country to deal with any post-election violence.

The AU does not appear to have a clear strategy to deal with erosion of democracy and has not been fully prepared to play the crucial role of helping prepare the electorate in each country to deal with any post-election violence.

Corruption also remains widespread and theft of resources and illicit capital flows continue unabated—and the AU does not seem to have a clear strategy to deal with them. The problem of illicit capital flows is particularly worrisome because some of the key actors involved are the country leaders who make decisions at the AU Assembly forums.

Crisis Response and Mediation

The Ebola crisis in West Africa has revealed major weaknesses in the AU, spurring calls for reform in the institution's operations. The main weakness here is the absence of emergency response action plans and also the failure by the AU to prioritize key issues that matter to the African people. This arises primarily from the fact that the AU is not represented at the grassroots and as a consequence, the African people's priorities are not reflected in the institution's responses. In fact, the AU seems to avoid many continent-wide and regional issues. One particularly important matter in which it has failed to provide leadership is the conflict over management of the allocation and utilization of water in the Nile River Basin, a contentious issue with the potential to degenerate into a major conflict. Avoiding difficult issues makes the AU largely irrelevant and is a situation that needs to change.

Providing a Global Voice

Finally, one thing that Africans expect is that uniting 54 nations greatly enhances the continent's standing in the arena of global governance. As noted previously, the AU, as authorized by these countries, is the legitimate representative of the continent on matters of global governance. Despite its size and large population, however, Africa's impact on global governance is marginal. In some situations, the African voice is ignored or even treated with disdain. Similarly, Africa does not really have much effective input into matters of international justice, as evidenced by the utterly undemocratic role played by the U.N. Security Council in various international governance issues. The International Criminal Court's focus on Africa in prosecuting individuals suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other atrocities is another example of a situation for which the AU has expressed concern

and that requires attention. (Murithi 2013; Kimenyi 2014).

This marginalization is also true when the international community is dealing with other issues such as the challenges of climate change, international financial flows, the flow of goods and services, global security, transnational terrorism, and corruption in international business transactions—problems vital and often disproportionately detrimental to the continent. The AU must pursue reforms to global institutions—such as in the U.N. Security Council—with determination and zeal and must not relent (*Daily Nation* 2014). The AU should push for the inclusion of at least two permanent membership seats for Africans.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

Despite these challenges, the African Union has, by all accounts, performed much better than the OAU. For example, although there are still many countries under autocratic rule, democracy is more widespread in the continent today. In addition, the AU has become more active in peace operations—a good example is AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia).

In the previous discussion, we have highlighted the various critical roles expected of the African Union and its apparent failures. In light of these priorities and disappointments, it is critical that this necessary organization undergoes key reforms and is restructured so that it can become a more efficient instrument for the economic and political transformation of Africa. These reforms include:

- 1. Financing:** As noted above, a serious problem that the AU faces in meeting its task has to do with inadequate funding. This has been particularly apparent in dealing with emergencies such as conflicts between various groups within a

country and the Ebola crisis. The delay in the creation of an African standing army is also mostly due to lack of resources. There are two interrelated problems when it comes to financing in the AU: low levels of funding through member country contributions and a high dependency on donors. The low funding by members is the outcome of an inadequate process of setting levels of member contributions and also enforcing compliance. Reliance on donors essentially constrains the choices and priorities of the AU and forces the institution to focus more on the interests of donors. The AU should adopt reforms that increase contributions from member countries and ensure timely payment. These could include instituting specific earmarked taxes and increasing the share of contributions by members accompanied with clear compliance enforcement.

2. Leadership: The issue of leadership is at the heart of the effectiveness of the AU and is particularly timely given that the Assembly of Heads of State will select a new chairperson in 2015. Like the OAU, the heads of state chair the organization on a rotational basis—there are no minimum standards of the quality and character of those elected to that position. The result has been that some of the chairs of the AU are individuals whose performance as heads of state, especially in the areas of democracy, accountability, transparency and human rights, is totally at odds with the ideals of the union. Under the leadership of such heads of state, pushing for progressive reforms has been quite difficult and often ignored.

Internationally, this leadership has undermined the reputation and credibility of the AU. Thus, African countries need to revisit the qualifications of the chair.

3. Strengthening the AU Commission:

The African Union Commission is the institution's implementing organ. Unfortunately, this is a weak organ and its implementing capacity is quite inadequate. The authority of the chair of the commission is limited, which has a significant impact on his or her ability to make the decisions necessary to advance the organization's mission. A key and necessary reform involves increasing the decision making authority of the chair of the commission so that he or she can more effectively implement decisions without delay. As the African Union Commission Chairperson's current term will expire in 2016, 2015 is an important year to consider these reforms.

4. Grassroots Representation:

The AU's ineffectiveness is, in many respects, due to the fact that it is quite often unable to fully appreciate the issues and problems facing Africans at the grassroots. This is due partly to the fact that the AU does not operate as a fully representative organization. One way to remedy this problem is to establish an AU parliament where members are elected directly by the voters in their respective countries. Such a representative assembly should enhance the ability of Africans to participate more fully in continental governance and make certain that the policies advanced by the AU reflect their interests and values.

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FIGHTING EBOLA: A STRATEGY FOR ACTION

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THE PRIORITY

African populations continue to suffer under the heavy burden of disease despite overall sustained increases in income levels over the last decade. Three major diseases are among those responsible for health crises: malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, and, in 2014, the Ebola virus emerged as a fourth virus with pandemic potential.


In 2012, for example, 80 percent of the estimated 207 million malaria cases worldwide were found in Africa, and 90 percent of the estimated 627,000 global malaria deaths occurred in Africa. On average, malaria kills a child every minute, of which 90 percent occur among African children. Malaria-related anemia is estimated to cause thousands of deaths a year—and for countries with endemic malaria, it is estimated that there is a 1.3 percentage point loss in GDP growth, and annual productivity losses are estimated in the billions (WHO 2013a, 2013b). Prior to 2014, HIV/AIDS was the biggest health crisis this generation of young Africans has faced, with staggering statistics. In 2005 alone, 23 million Africans were living with HIV, 13 million children were AIDS orphans and 1.8 million people died of the disease.

Despite these overwhelming numbers, progress is being made in the fight against these diseases. For example, malaria mortality rates in children in Africa were reduced by an estimated 54 percent between 2002 and 2012. Since 2000, there has been a 49 percent reduction in the overall malaria mortality rates in Africa. For HIV, by the end of 2012, about 68 percent of eligible persons were receiving antiretroviral treatment, an increase of more than 90 percent since 2009 (UNAIDS 2013).

However, 2014 in West Africa will be remembered not for progress made in combatting infectious diseases but as the year the Ebola virus crippled three countries on the continent and inflicted economic damage to many others. The 20th Ebola outbreak globally has captured the attention of the world like none of the others that have preceded it and like no other disease has in recent history. The death toll from the Ebola epidemic, which began in December 2013 in Guinea, had risen to over 6,388 worldwide by December 10, 2014 with an estimated 18,000 people affected in eight countries over three continents: Africa, North America and Europe. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone were the most affected, with 1,428, 3,177 and 1,768¹ deaths, respectively. Recently, there has been a

¹ Cumulative number of confirmed, probable and suspected deaths of the Ebola virus disease by December 10, 2014. <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.ebola-sitrep>.

FIGURE 1



Note: The figures displayed represent the cumulative number of confirmed, probable and suspected cases of the Ebola virus disease. Source: WHO Ebola Response Roadmap Situation Reports.

Global Ebola Fatality Rates (August 29-December 10, 2014)

	Total Cases	Total Deaths	Case Fatality Rate
Guinea	2,292	1,428	62%
Liberia	7,719	3,177	41%
Sierra Leone	7,897	1,768	22%
Mali	8	6	75%
Nigeria	20	8	40%
Senegal	1	0	0%
Spain	1	0	0%
United States	4	1	25%

Note: The figures displayed represent the cumulative number of confirmed, probable and suspected cases and deaths of the Ebola virus disease by December 10, 2014. Case fatality rates were calculated based on these figures.

Source: WHO Ebola Response Roadmap Situation Reports.

steady uptick in the number of cases in Mali, while Senegal and Nigeria successfully treated and eliminated the disease after one confirmed case in Senegal, and 20 confirmed cases and eight deaths in Nigeria. The United States and Spain have also had four and one confirmed cases, respectively.

Though the number of new deaths is decreasing, the announcement of new cases every day hangs over the continent like an ominous cloud. Neighboring countries are all on heightened alert as the risk to them is highest. An epidemic that was initially confined to three countries is impacting the whole continent—from east to west and north to south—in ways not seen since the peak of the HIV/AIDS crisis.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

Africa's growth has remained resilient despite the overall deceleration in global growth. Sub-Saharan Africa was projected to grow at 5.2 percent in 2014 and 5.7 percent in 2015—up from 4.9 in 2013. At a time when Africa was beginning to consolidate its growth, the fatality of the Ebola virus will knock the three most affected countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) off course—mainly due to its prohibitive impact on trade, economic activity in the agriculture, mining, services, and particularly tourism sectors, as well as spillover effects throughout the region, especially if the epidemic is not contained.

Economies Have Taken a Hit

Economic activity has ground to a halt in these countries as their populations try to protect themselves from the disease. The total fiscal impact of the crisis is well over half a billion dollars in 2014 alone in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (World Bank 2014a) and could deepen in 2015. Their economies are expected to deflate by over 20-30 percent. The agriculture sector, which employs over two-thirds of their rural populations,

was hit significantly, with agricultural growth in all three countries revised downwards for 2015 (in Guinea from 5.7 to 3.3, Liberia from 3.5 to 1.3 percent, and Sierra Leone from 4.6 to 2.6 percent) (World Bank 2014b). Thus, in addition to economic activity contracting, increasing food prices threaten to compound the Ebola epidemic with a food security crisis.

Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea all depend on natural resources, including the mining sector, for revenue and jobs. In 2012, total revenue from natural resources, including mineral exports accounted for 26.1 percent, 8.6 percent and 30.1 percent of GDP, respectively. The Ebola virus has disrupted these supply chains and, in many cases, forced the slowdown or outright closure of mines. In Liberia, for example, Arcelor Mittal (MT), the largest mining company in the country, decided to postpone its planned investment to expand its production capacity from 5.2 million tons of iron ore to 15 million tons. China Union, the second-largest mining company, shut down its operations in August. As a result, the mining sector growth forecast by the World Bank for 2014 has been revised from 4.4 percent growth to a 1.3 percent contraction. In Sierra Leone, the country's second-largest iron ore producer, London Mining, shut down. The London-listed company was one of the country's largest employers, with over 1,400 employees.

The mining sector in Guinea does not make up as much of the economy as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thanks to the fact that Guinea's major mines are far from the affected zones, the expected contraction is not projected to further deteriorate: The initial projection of mining sector growth was -3 percent, and the revised projection of -3.4 percent is only slightly worse. However, exploration work on the Simandou mine, with one of the largest iron ore deposits in the world, could slow considerably, impacting Guinea's long-term growth prospects (Cussen n.d.).

Reports indicate that sourcing patterns are also being affected. Buyers in Surat, India, where an estimated 80 percent of the world's diamonds are cut and polished, have stopped sending their traders to West Africa and have even returned parcels originating from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea over fears of the disease.

Importantly, the three affected countries are also emerging from relatively long periods of conflict. Increasing unemployment created by these drastic economic conditions could lead to renewed social tensions, damaging the hard-won peace and emerging political stability in this region of West Africa.

The Continent Is Susceptible to Spillover Effects

The stigma around Ebola is the strongest ever. While only three out of 48 countries on the continent are battling with the disease in earnest (the situation in Mali is still developing) the whole continent is suffering from the stigma. South Korean Airlines, for example, stopped flights to Kenya in East Africa. Many countries have closed their borders to visitors from all of West Africa. This move has amplified the impact of the disease specifically on regional trade. For example, Senegal closed its land border with Guinea and initially banned flights and ships from all three of the most affected countries in August; it lifted this travel ban in November, although the Guinean border remains closed. While the trade effects from these bans were minimal—since Senegal's exports to these countries only account for two percent of its total exports—its trade revenues could seriously decline if the disease spreads further in Mali (Senegal's top export destination) and Senegal reacts by restricting travel.

From the Gambia to Ghana, to countries as far afield as South Africa and Kenya, economic growth is being affected by the Ebola virus.

In the Gambia, where tourism is 12 percent of GDP, tourists' hotel reservations have dropped by 65 percent (Nshimyumuremyi 2014; World Bank 2014b). A recent survey conducted by Safaribookings.com of 500 tour operators found that they are experiencing a 20 to 70 percent drop in forward bookings because of fear of Ebola in Kenya, South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia—countries nowhere near the outbreak. This contagion effect is further undermining growth and the possibility of a recovery as the large economies in West Africa—such as Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, which could help cushion the impact of the virus—are all being impacted. In Lagos, commercial businesses reported a marked decline in sales, estimated at 20 to 40 percent, following the initial case of Ebola in Nigeria. In Senegal, hotel occupancy in the coastal region of Saly dropped by over 40 percent. While impacts have been modest, should the virus spread neighboring countries could be hit hard.

Borders Are Closing

As noted above, some countries have moved to close their borders to visitors from the three most affected countries. As the crisis continued to escalate in October 2014, over 15 African countries had explicit border closures: In many countries citizens and lawmakers panicked and demanded that their government close the borders. In countries with limited human capacity and resources such as Guinea Bissau policymakers used border closing as the cheapest and safest protection. While some countries have relaxed the measures in recent weeks and humanitarian corridors are being opened, travel to the three most affected countries is still generally discouraged by most OECD foreign offices (by France and the U.S., for example). The quarantine of countries is further exacerbating their economic distress and impacting regional trade, straining relationships between countries and may result in a setback of the regional integration agenda.

Already Weak Health Systems Are Faltering

The disease is damaging already weak health systems and rolling back limited gains in strengthening education, social welfare and other public institutions. And this impact will be felt for a long time. The Ebola virus is killing hundreds of doctors and nurses. In fact, medical personnel are the most affected sub-group. There is also a crisis of confidence in the very institutions set up to address the disease. With high mortality rates in health centers, mainly due to an absence of appropriate protocols or equipment, many infected patients are staying away. In addition, non-Ebola affected patients such as pregnant mothers are scared of seeking care or unable to find care due to the inundation of hospitals by Ebola patients.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

In the Short Term

In the short term, the focus should first be on winning the battle and getting to zero cases in all countries. This effort will require strong leadership from the respective governments and their health services. The cases of Nigeria and Senegal both demonstrate that, with strong leadership, a swift response to the disease, and adequate professional staff, the disease can be contained. Countries will have to put in place systems for diagnosing, tracking and conquering the disease, which requires communications systems that are functional. For example, in Nigeria, public service announcements via text messages were deployed daily to inform and sensitize the population. Private sector providers should be willing to work with governments to ensure that messages are sent in a timely and effective manner.

Leadership and adequate coordination on the part of the international community will also be extremely important. While there is broad


recognition that the international community was slow to act, there is now a common understanding of the need for rapid and concerted action as evidenced by the G-20 call to action in Brisbane, Australia. In West Africa, under the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) leadership, an Ebola working group has been in place to manage the epidemic.

Second, restoring confidence in the health systems remains an important part of the short-term challenge. Ebola is attacking the very health systems responsible for controlling and eradicating it. In Albert Camus' novel *The Plague*, the characters did not wait for the government to provide health workers. Instead, many able-bodied individuals at the community level were mobilized immediately to fight the plague. The key to success was the isolation of cases. In this way, the novel provides a lesson that could be used to address outbreaks while more health workers are mobilized. At the moment, African countries have mobilized over 380 health workers according to the African Union to assist the countries in addition to the U.S., Cuba, and the U.K., among others.

Similarly, the international community can assist, by providing technical assistance to train medical personnel both in the public and private sector, and by helping the government regulate and supervise private practices to ensure all protocols are respected. In particular, the international community could support the development of a community of practice networks between countries to share experiences and discuss emerging issues.

Third, along the same lines, there is a need for rapid financing to assist countries in managing the demand for basic health services, especially when public resources are already stretched. In Senegal it cost over a million dollars to manage one case, and in Nigeria it is estimated that about 13 million dollars was needed to manage its cases. Bringing the cases to zero would

FIGURE 2



Note: This chart displays the top 10 countries and institutions that have donated to fighting this Ebola crisis. Over 50 other countries have donated or pledged another \$274.6 million. Source: UNOCHA Financial Tracking System.

require substantially more resources for the three countries affected. To date, the international community and the private sector have pledged over \$1.3 billion to assist already affected countries in combatting the disease. In a historic move, the U.S. Congress has pledged \$5.4 billion to fund worldwide Ebola fighting efforts. Importantly, countries at risk (14 in West and Central Africa, and South Sudan according to the World Health Organization) must also make domestic financing available for basic prevention and put in place contingency plans in the event of an outbreak. The private sector, and many African philanthropic organizations, have provided and continue to provide financial assistance to governments. These developments are positive and welcome.

Fourth, governments must implement clear systems to maintain peace and order while organizing the communities and managing the needs of citizens. In a number of instances, there has been civil unrest due to weak

management of populations stressed by the crisis, such as the incidents in Freetown in Monrovia. This disorder, if not rapidly contained, could further complicate the problem. In Senegal, the government successfully used civil society organizations, NGOs and local community leaders to help with the information campaign but also with civil order.

Finally, there is a need for continued international communication on the incidences of Ebola so that countries that are not affected by the virus do not bear the brunt of sanctions and that countries with the virus are not unduly quarantined. This advocacy, however, must be coupled with stepped-up control identification and tracking of affected persons by countries impacted. The international community can help to finance and set up border control monitoring stations in order to achieve this objective.

In the Medium and Long Term

Over the medium to long term, the focus should be on strengthening health systems to be able to deal with such crises. Countries must adequately fund their health sector and ensure the system is progressive. The U.S. experience, in which 15 percent of GDP is spent on health care with rather poor access and outcomes, demonstrates that the focus should not be on how much of the national budget is allocated to the health sector but on what results are expected and how the public and private sectors can collaborate to provide adequate health care with appropriate staffing, skills and technology.

Second, the private sector and the international community should work together to fund and develop vaccines for the disease through innovative financial instruments like the ones for malaria, such as the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Partnership and others. Similarly, the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm) is a particularly creative financial mechanism that uses securitized bond offerings to

front-load medium- to long-term donor funding so that donors can finance immunization campaigns in the near-term, thereby reducing the disease burden in the long run.

In addition to developing vaccines, more laboratories are needed on the continent to help with disease diagnosis. The efforts of the non-governmental organization Institut Pasteur of Dakar are noteworthy. Initially it took 24 hours or more in Guinea and Sierra Leone to diagnose a case. With the installation of Institut Pasteur local labs in both countries, diagnosis time has been reduced to 12 hours. This kind of regional support as well as the role of ECOWAS in the fight against Ebola must be strengthened.

Third, an economic recovery and reconstruction plan to assist countries in re-launching their economies is critical. This endeavor requires rapid financing of infrastructure and agriculture projects that can create jobs. With Ebola, the risk of investing in Africa has increased and as such international financial institutions may need to develop innovative guarantee instruments to assist the private sector to buy down the risk of investing in the affected countries. The international community, working in collaboration with the public and private sector, can facilitate these tasks. The International Monetary Fund has already suggested that countries most affected by the crisis should increase their deficits in order to restore growth, which counters the IMF's usual orthodoxy on closing deficit gaps.

Fourth, affected governments will also have to put in place and reinforce safety net systems in order to protect the poor and the vulnerable who have been hard hit by the crisis.

Fifth, the international community must learn from the lessons of the past and ensure that, in focusing on winning the battle against Ebola, other health issues—such as HIV/AIDS and the overall health system—are not undermined. While many African countries are not set to meet the targets set out in the Millennium Development Goal 6 (“Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases”) some progress has been made in combatting these diseases. Many countries have developed aggressive plans to combat the disease and the fight to bring Ebola to zero should not undermine efforts already underway.

Finally, global governance of health systems needs to be improved. The Ebola epidemic and the response of the international community demonstrated that there is a need to revisit the global health crisis and security management system and the protocol for dealing with pandemics at the international level. The initial slow reaction of the international community indicates an absence of leadership and lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities between the technical, funding and implementing agencies both at the national and international levels.

Awa Marie Coll Seck, minister of health and social action of Senegal and former department head of UNAIDS, contributed to this piece.

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2015: A PIVOTAL YEAR FOR OBAMA'S AFRICA LEGACY

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THE PRIORITY

The legacy of the Obama administration in Africa is very much a work in progress. Several initiatives address genuine opportunities and concerns, yet other aspects of the U.S. agenda need sustained attention. The next 12 months will determine whether President Obama will fulfill the tremendous promise of his presidency as it concerns U.S. policy toward the continent.

Much to the disappointment of many in the United States and Africa, President Obama paid little attention to Africa during his first four years in office. In June 2012, the administration issued the “U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” which developed a clear framework for engaging the region. Since then, the White House has put in place a series of initiatives to implement the strategy, which could provide a very positive legacy in Africa for Obama. Given the high expectations when he entered office, the relevance of President Obama’s legacy will be defined by his ability to raise Africa as a priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, deepen commercial ties with the continent and forge effective partnerships with African nations to respond to the most pressing security challenges.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

On a continent where more than two-thirds of the population is without electricity, **Power Africa**—a public-private partnership designed to make electricity available across the continent—has the potential to be truly transformative over time. The program involves 12 U.S. agencies and \$7 billion in U.S. government commitments, in addition to another \$20 billion in direct loans, guarantee facilities and equity investments from financial partners. In fact, in 2014, the president tripled the initiative’s target from 10,000 MW to 30,000 MW of electricity generation capacity, and increased the number of households and businesses that will gain access to a reliable supply of electricity from 20 million to 60 million.

No administration has done more to move trade and investment to the forefront of U.S. engagement in Africa than the current one, though President Clinton’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) initially introduced trade as a key stimulus for economic development in the region. Whether it is President Obama’s participation in two U.S.-Africa business fora in the space of 13 months (Tanzania in July 2013 and Washington in August 2014), or the private sector’s role in Power Africa, **Feed the Future** and the **Young African Leaders Initiative**


(YALI), Obama understands the critical importance of leveraging the power of commercial engagement to enhance the U.S. role in Africa.

For instance, both Feed the Future, President Obama’s global food security initiative, and YALI, which provides intensive leadership training for young African leaders, rely on private sector support to operate. Feed the Future is leveraging over \$10 billion in private sector investments (in partnership with the African Union Commission) to assist African countries in the implementation of their national food security strategies. The YALI program has received \$38 million in funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development to build four regional leadership centers in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and South Africa; these funds have been matched by investments of \$70 million from U.S. and African companies.

At the same time, no issue is as important to U.S. commercial objectives on the continent as the extension of the **African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)**. As the cornerstone of the U.S.-African commercial relationship, AGOA provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for 6,400 products from 40 countries. If AGOA is not extended in a timely manner in 2015, Obama’s credibility in Africa would be severely diminished, and U.S.-African trade and investment relations would be weakened. However, if there is a 10- to 15-year extension of AGOA, trade and investment would be secure as a priority in U.S.-Africa relations for the foreseeable future. This would be a very welcome development for the long-term benefit of all.

The Obama administration, however, has expressed a desire not merely to extend AGOA

FIGURE 1



Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries (MICs) or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs. The rest of SACU includes Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. Information presented in this table was generated as part of a modeling exercise Brookings undertook with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in July 2013. For more see Mevel et al. 2013.

but to strengthen the legislation as well. In addition to calling for a “long-term” and “seamless” extension, including the third country fabric provision—which allows AGOA beneficiaries to source textile inputs such as yarns and fabrics from any other country (for example, India and China)—the White House expressed a desire to expand AGOA’s product coverage by examining 316 tariff lines, mostly agricultural products, that might be included in the renewed legislation. Improving rules of origin and updating the AGOA eligibility criteria and review process were two other areas in which the administration expressed an interest to see AGOA strengthened.

Nevertheless, even if AGOA is extended in a timely manner, the administration’s trade agenda in Africa could be frustrated on two fronts. U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman sought to achieve a trade and investment agreement with the East African Community (EAC), one of the fastest growing regional markets on the continent. The administration does expect to sign a trade facilitation agreement on agricultural and industrial standards with the EAC in 2015 but it is unclear whether it will be a stepping stone to a more structured and binding agreement. Moreover, the U.S. now has **Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs)** with 12 countries and regional organizations in sub-Saharan Africa and six **Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)**. Despite these positive developments, given that none of the BITs are with our largest trading partners (i.e., Nigeria, South Africa, Angola and Kenya) and the TIFAs are nonbinding, U.S. trade ties with Africa remain overly dependent on AGOA and policy dialogues.

In addition, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) of the European Union also threaten to impede the access of U.S. companies to the African market. The EPAs are reciprocal trade agreements that compel African governments to allow EU companies and

Trade and Investment Framework Agreements

Country/Partner	Year Entered Into Force
Angola	2009
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	2001
Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)	2014
East African Community (EAC)	2008
Ghana	1999
Liberia	2007
Mauritius	2006
Mozambique	2005
Nigeria	2000
Rwanda	2006
South Africa	2010
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)	2002

Bilateral Investment Treaties

Country/Partner	Year Entered Into Force
Cameroon	1989
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1989
Republic of the Congo	1994
Mozambique	2005
Rwanda	2012
Senegal	1990


products preferential access to African markets. They have been roundly criticized for undermining intra-regional and U.S-African trade by granting European companies advantages over even their African counterparts within regional markets. Meanwhile, AGOA is a non-reciprocal preference program designed to accelerate economic development in Africa. Unfortunately, AGOA and the EPAs are working at cross-purposes, to the detriment of Africa’s development objectives and U.S. commercial interests. The

administration's silence on the friction between EPAs and AGOA ensures that American companies, goods and services will be at a competitive disadvantage in the African market.

It is instructive to examine the impact of the EU-South African free trade agreement¹ that was signed in 1999. According to the National Trade Estimates of 2014, "U.S. exports face a disadvantage to EU goods in South Africa," (USTR 2014). This tariff disadvantage impacts U.S. firms in a range of sectors, including cosmetics, plastics, textiles, trucks, agricultural exports and agricultural machinery. It is a safe prediction that U.S. manufacturers will face a similar disadvantage over the next decade in the 33 countries in Africa that have initialed EPAs. By raising this issue in the context of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, and working to harmonize the EU and U.S. trade programs for Africa, Obama would do a great service for U.S. commercial interests and the prospects for regional integration in Africa.

The robust commercial engagement by Chinese private and state-owned companies across the continent further demonstrates the challenge faced by American companies establishing a presence on the continent. In 2009, China overtook the U.S. as Africa's largest trading partner. Two-way trade between China and Africa was \$210 billion in 2013, and there are no signs that the commercial engagement is slowing (see Figure 2) (TRALAC 2014). In fact, 2014 was the first year in which Chinese outbound investment exceeded inbound foreign direct investment. In November, China's premier, Li Keqiang, announced a 10-point plan for financial reform, which includes a pledge to use China's vast foreign reserves for "the development of an overseas market for Chinese high-end equipment and goods" (Kynge & Noble 2014). Engaging China for trilateral cooperation, rather than fierce competition, among U.S., African and Chinese companies could work for the better of all.

FIGURE 2



Source: TRALAC 2014.

¹ Formally known as the EU-South African Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA).

In fact, President Obama has signaled his openness in this area. As he told *The Economist* (2014): “When I was in Africa, the question of China often came up, and my attitude was every country that sees investment opportunities and is willing to partner with African countries should be welcomed. The caution is to make sure that African governments negotiate a good deal with whoever they’re partnering with. And that is true whether it’s the United States; that’s true whether it’s China. And I do think that China has certain capacity, for example, to build infrastructure in Africa that’s critical.”

The U.S. will also need to step up support for American companies to help them become more successful in Africa.

One of the administration’s signal triumphs in 2014 was the **U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit**. Given the challenge of hosting 50 heads of state and their delegations in Washington, there was a great deal of uncertainty prior to the event. However, the genuine engagement by the president and the administration, the focused but relatively free-flowing structure of the event and the several thousand supporters who converged on Washington to participate in innumerable events with the visiting delegations, made the summit a truly unique experience. The administration announced \$14 billion in new deals at the summit in an effort to emphasize its commitment to promote U.S. investment on the continent. These deals included investments in clean energy, aviation, banking and construction. The president must maintain this momentum for the summit to have a significant impact on the continent.

Africa’s potential will not be achieved unless it can enhance security on the continent. To this end, the administration announced the **Security Governance Initiative** at the summit, a joint program between the U.S. and Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia. The goal of this program is to strengthen civilian and mili-

tary institutions and the ministerial responsibilities that provide state oversight of the security sector. Responding to threats posed by groups like Boko Haram, al-Shabab and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is one of the goals of the program. (For more on security challenges facing the continent, see “**How the West Can Do More Militarily in Africa.**”)

Nevertheless, the Obama administration needs to do more to rationalize and enhance the U.S. engagement in Africa’s security challenges in 2015. In addition to the Security Governance Initiative, another security program, the **African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (or A-Prep)**, was launched at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit. However, it appears that the U.S. security engagement in Africa lacks an overall strategic framework and, as a result, is made up of a series of loosely connected programs and initiatives that are successful to varying degrees. For example, U.S. support for the U.N.-AU force in Somalia, AMISOM, has been critical in pushing al-Shabab out of Mogadishu. At the same time, the U.S. has been helping Ugandans hunt for Joseph Kony for more than a decade, without success, although a number of his lieutenants have been removed. The unexpected overthrow of the Mali government in 2012 led by a U.S.-trained soldier, and the decision by the Nigerian government in December to halt U.S. training of its soldiers to fight Boko Haram suggests a need, at minimum, for the U.S. to review its strategic approach to responding to Africa’s security challenges.

Finally, inevitably, the Obama legacy in Africa will be impacted significantly by the **U.S. response to the Ebola crisis**. The administration’s initial response did not take place for nine months after the first cases were reported. For an administration that launched the Global Health Initiative in 2010 as a “comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to shape U.S. investments in global health,” the delayed response was inexplicable. In September, Obama

announced a scaled-up response, including the deployment of 3,000 troops and the construction of 17 Ebola treatment centers in Liberia to train 500 health care providers per week, among other steps. (For more on the Ebola crisis in Africa, see **“Fighting Ebola: A Strategy for Action.”**)

By the end of December, it appeared that the administration had mounted an effective response to the crisis, especially in Liberia. Rebuilding the economies of the affected countries will be important and the U.S. should encourage an international response as occurred after the SARS epidemic (2003-2004), the earthquake in Haiti (2010), and the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake in Asia, which created the epic tsunami in Asia (2004).

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015

President Obama needs to take several actions in 2015 to fully define his legacy in Africa. In fact, there are a number of areas in which he can fulfill the potential of his current term in office and also enhance the foundation of U.S.-African relations for many years to come. These include:

- Gaining passage in 2015 of the still-pending **Energize Africa Act** in the new Congress will ensure ongoing funding for Power Africa and that the initiative will exist after Obama leaves office.
- Similarly, the president must push to extend and strengthen AGOA. An enhanced, long-term AGOA, especially with an expansion of product coverage and a review of eligibility criteria, would ensure a new relevance for the legislation and impact very positively on Obama's legacy in Africa.
- The Obama administration should use the next two years to develop a new bipartisan and mutually beneficial framework for

deepening commercial ties with Africa that is legally enforceable. A free trade agreement that takes into account the development challenges or “asymmetrical” realities that exist between the U.S. and Africa would be a good place to start.

- In addition, the U.S. could leverage its network of TIFAs to address private sector issues. With the launch of the three regional Trade and Investment Hubs and an expanded Commerce Department presence, the TIFAs could be useful vehicles for bringing U.S. and African officials together to help to advance U.S. commercial interests on the continent.
- The Obama administration should engage China in an effort to foster trilateral cooperation in specific areas among U.S., Chinese and African companies. Power Africa and Feed the Future could be useful vehicles for achieving this cooperation.
- An effective follow-up to the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit will be central to ensuring that the gains made in August are sustained. To this end, the president should convene an African Leaders Forum in Africa that would focus on the gains made by Power Africa, Feed the Future, the Young Africa Leaders Initiative and, hopefully, a renewed and strengthened AGOA. A third Obama visit to the continent would help ensure accountability for the commitments made at the 2014 summit and deepen the impact of the administration's key initiatives.
- President Obama should also address the African Union. Not only would it be historic but, as the first African-American president, it would have a special resonance for millions across the continent.
- In terms of security, the Secretary of Defense-designate, Ashton Carter, should


plan to meet with his African counterparts, perhaps initially on a regional basis. The U.S. meets at the ministerial level with energy, trade and finance officials but there has yet to be a similar dialogue on security issues. It is time to initiate this conversation.

The Obama legacy in Africa could be singularly significant but more work needs to be done to ensure its full potential is realized.

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Presidential and Legislative Elections in Africa in 2015



Note: This map reflects all confirmed elections as of December 22, 2014 according to the National Democratic Institute, <https://www.ndi.org/electionscalendar>.

AFRICAN ELECTIONS IN 2015: A SNAPSHOT FOR CÔTE D'IVOIRE, TANZANIA, BURKINA FASO AND SUDAN

John Mukum Mbaku, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative



INTRODUCTION

In 2015, many countries in Africa—including the **Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Mauritius, Niger, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo** and **Zambia**—will conduct presidential and/or legislative elections. Most of these countries have struggled with transition to democracy at least since the mid-1980s, and some of them much more recently. The 2015 elections, then, for some, could be turning points for embracing democracy more closely, and, for others, for significantly deepening and institutionalizing democracy and emerging as democratic strongholds on the continent.

The failure to manage ethnic and religious diversity and provide institutional structures that enhance peaceful coexistence, national integration and nation-building, remains one of the continent's most intractable governance problems. This failure has produced political economies that are pervaded by violence, most of it attributable to destructive mobilization by ethnic and/or religious groups that consider themselves marginalized by public policies, pushed to the economic and political periphery, and prevented from participating gainfully in economic growth. Minimizing violent mobilization requires state reconstruction through

democratic constitution making to provide each country with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law—where the latter exists, the law is supreme; a majority of the citizens voluntarily accept and respect the law; there is judicial independence; the law is not administered arbitrarily or capriciously but citizens are able to expect predictable results; there is protection of human rights, including those of minority ethnic and religious groups; and governments operate in an open and transparent manner.

Openness and transparency are very important for governance in Africa. Making certain that public policies are designed and implemented in an open and transparent manner not only reduces corruption but also improves the chances that these policies will reflect the values, interests and aspirations of the country's relevant stakeholders. If discontented groups have either had the opportunity to participate fully and effectively in policy design and implementation, or were quite aware of how these policies were chosen and why, they are less likely to resort to destructive mobilization.

A major challenge for all countries that will conduct elections in 2015 will be to ensure that the majority of their citizens see these elections as free, fair and credible. These governments

must (1) provide the security necessary to ensure that no one participating in the elections is threatened, molested or denied access to the process; (2) make certain that the opposition is provided with adequate access to the media, including government-owned and operated outlets, so that it can fully and effectively explain its platform to prospective voters; (3) create an open dialogue with all constituencies to prevent feelings of marginalization; (4) minimize political corruption and avoid any activities (e.g., vote-rigging) that can place the opposition at a competitive disadvantage and enhance the ability of the incumbent government to win the elections; (5) make sure that the national election commission is independent enough to function effectively in carrying out the election; and (6) provide facilities for domestic and international monitors so that they can perform their jobs well and ensure that the elections are fair, free and credible.

Importantly, the policy priority for the post-election governments should be participatory constitution making to reconstruct the state and provide institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law. However, even if the 2015 elections are successfully carried out and are considered fair, free, and credible, many of these countries will still continue to suffer from high levels of corruption, violence, inequality, and low economic growth and development unless they are provided with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law.

Below, we present an overview of some upcoming African elections in 2015. (For an in-depth look at Nigeria's elections, see **"The 2015 Presidential Elections in Nigeria: The Issues and Challenges."**) Over 15 African countries are planning elections in 2015; however, due to space limitations, this brief only discusses elections in Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and the Republic of Sudan.

Côte d'Ivoire

Historical Context



After independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire was led by the authoritarian leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny until his death in 1993. His successor, Henri Konan Bédié, who was overthrown in 1999, disastrously emphasized ethnicity in public service, effectively excluding individuals who were not considered *indigènes* of Côte d'Ivoire from serving in administrative positions. In fact, former International Monetary Fund executive and current president of Côte d'Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, was disqualified from participating in the 2000 presidential elections because of his ethnicity. Then, President Bédié and many others, claimed that Ouattara was a Burkinabè from neighboring Burkina Faso, and the country's new constitution, approved in 2000, mandated that a presidential candidate's parents must both be Ivorian. The citizenship issue partly spurred Côte d'Ivoire's 2002-2007 civil war.

However, in 2007, Laurent Gbagbo, president since the 2000 elections, declared that Ouattara was qualified to run in the 2010 presidential elections. In the second round of elections, an independent electoral commission declared Ouattara the winner with 54 percent of the vote. However, Gbagbo's supporters argued that there had been fraud and sought to annul votes from several regions. The Constitutional Council then annulled the electoral commission's declaration and concluded that Gbagbo had won 51 percent of the vote. Ouattara and Gbagbo took parallel oaths of office—though the international community, including the African Union, recognized Ouattara as the legitimate president. These events resulted in a second civil war and, subsequently, Gbagbo was arrested by the International Criminal Court in

2011 for crimes against humanity. Ouattara remains the president of Côte d'Ivoire.

Election 2015

Côte d'Ivoire has set presidential elections for October 2015. The major players in these elections are (1) incumbent Allasane Ouattara and his *Rassemblement des républicains* (RDR); and (2) the *Front populaire ivoirien* (FPI). The FPI, previously led by the now-indicted Gbagbo, is currently led by Pascal Affi N'Guessan who will likely participate in the 2015 elections. The FPI boycotted the 2011 parliamentary elections, citing bias by the electoral commission for incumbent Ouattara, intimidation of FPI supporters by the national army, and the government banning of the pro-FPI newspaper *Notre Voie*. In fall 2014, the FPI withdrew from, but later returned to, the electoral commission, raising fears that the party might boycott the elections. Such a boycott by the FPI would have undermined both the credibility of the elections and the country's efforts to usher in a period of peace and national reconstruction.

Henri Konan Bédié and the *Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) were expected to be strong contenders in the 2015 elections. However, in mid-September 2014, Bédié endorsed Ouattara for re-election in 2015, effectively ruling himself out as a candidate for the presidency of the republic in 2015.

The current Ouattara-led coalition government of the RDR and PDCI was supposed to engage Ivorians in a process of state reconstruction, but the institutional structures and governing process that have failed Ivorians in the past remain in place. For one thing, the question of citizenship, a major contributor to the civil wars, has not been resolved. In addition, the FPI and Gbagbo followers believe that they have been pushed to the political and economic periphery, and restless urban youth cry that only the

politically connected have access to food (See, e.g., *Aljazeera* 2013; BBC World Service n.d.; *IRIN* 2008).

Thus, Ivorians face many challenges in the years to come: They must deal with issues such as citizenship; government impunity; entrepreneurship and the full participation of all groups in wealth creation; and peaceful coexistence—all issues that have contributed to past violent conflicts. Whoever wins the elections (and the endorsement of Ouattara's candidacy by Bédié, one of the country's political heavyweights, makes Ouattara a likely winner of the 2015 presidential contest) should form a government that reflects the country's ethnic and religious diversity so that it can effectively lead a credible reconstruction effort. The Ouattara government must work with its international benefactors to make certain that the 2015 elections are fair, free and credible. More importantly, given the distrust that Gbagbo supporters currently have in the incumbent government, it is necessary that the latter create conditions that would significantly improve the chances that the FPI and other opposition groups will accept the results of the 2015 elections and abide by them.

Of course, the post-election government must engage all of the country's relevant stakeholder groups in robust dialogue about issues that are critical to peaceful coexistence, national integration, nation-building, and human development. These include, inter alia, citizenship, youth unemployment, and poverty, especially among vulnerable groups (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, and the urban poor).

United Republic of Tanzania

Historical Context

On April 26, 1964, Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar to



form the United Republic of Tanzania—within the latter, Zanzibar remains a semi-autonomous region with its own government. Throughout most of its existence as an independent and sovereign nation, Tanzania has functioned exclusively as a one-party state.

However, since 1992, there have been four credible competitive elections—in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010—all won by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (Party of the Revolution). Though the CCM has been the winner, its margin of victory has not been overwhelming, and most Tanzanians and international observers have considered these elections free, fair and credible. In the general elections held in 2010, incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete received 63 percent of the vote while the party captured 78 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. In the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar, Ali Mohamed Shein of the CCM won 50 percent of the vote in the presidential election and the CCM won 50 percent of the seats in the assembly—against the opposition Civic United Front’s (CUF) 47 percent.

So, while the CMM has remained dominant, other parties, especially the Chadema (Party for Democracy and Progress), a center-right movement whose popularity continues to increase, have provided effective and growing challenges. In the elections of 2010, for example, Chadema captured 27 percent (presidential) and 24 percent (parliamentary) of the vote. The Civic United Front, another opposition party, captured 8 percent (presidential) and 24 percent (parliamentary) of the vote. These results show a significant deepening of political competition.

Election 2015

Tanzania’s fifth general elections will take place in October 2015. Notably, President Kikwete is constitutionally barred from contesting for a third term, and a large number of candidates

are throwing their hats into the ring. Presently, the most important political parties in Tanzania and their leaders are the incumbent CCM (Mizengo Pinda—presently the prime minister, but is battling an internal challenge to his nomination); Chadema (Freeman Mbowe); and CUF (Mohamed Mnyaa).

Since 1992, when multiparty political competition was reintroduced into Tanzania, opposition parties have significantly improved their ability to challenge the CCM. In fact, as noted above, in the 2010 presidential elections, candidates representing CHADEMA and CUF jointly captured 35 percent of the vote against the incumbent CCM’s 63 percent. This year, the growing strength of opposition parties could force the winning candidate to seek the help of the opposition in forming a government capable of effectively governing the country. Such a “unity” government would be one that includes individuals from not just the winning political party, but from others.

It is expected that the 2015 elections will provide the opportunity for further deepening and institutionalization of democracy in Tanzania. Perhaps, the opposition could capture the government and bring about new and fresh approaches to dealing with what have become intractable problems—rising poverty; high levels of unemployment, especially among the youth and other vulnerable groups (e.g., women and rural inhabitants); high prices, especially for food and fuel; and bureaucratic corruption.

Notably, Tanzania is also currently going through a constitutional review process. It is expected that the new constitution will be adopted before the October 2015 elections. Major amendments might include the removal of gender discrimination from the law (such an amendment to the constitution would allow a woman to transmit her nationality to her husband); ending the ban on dual nationality; removing the rights to citizenship based on birth

in Tanzania; and creating a federal union comprising three governments—a Tanganyika government, a union government, and a Zanzibar Isles government. This constitutional process is not without controversy: The CCM-dominated parliament has approved the country's draft constitution, despite the fact that opposition parties have refused to participate in the process on the grounds that their suggestions have been ignored. The next step is for the constitutional draft to be presented to the public for approval by referendum.

Although elections in Tanzania since 1992 have generally been adjudged fair and free by both Tanzanians and foreign observers, the CCM-led government should continue to ensure that the process remains so, especially in light of legitimate and serious challenges to its political power.

Burkina Faso

Historical Context

Shortly after Upper Volta (which changed its name to Burkina Faso in 1984) gained independence from France in 1960, it was led by Maurice Yaméogo, who quickly banned all political opposition, forcing mass riots and demonstrations that only came to an end after the military intervened in 1966. Military coups in 1980, 1982 and 1983 continued to usher in authoritarian leaders. Although the leader of the 1983 coup, Captain Thomas Sankara, introduced many institutional reforms that effectively aligned the country with Marxist ideals, he was overthrown in 1987 by Captain Blaise Compaoré, who subsequently reversed all of Sankara's progressive policies and led the country until he resigned under pressure in late 2014.



In 2000, the country's post-Cold War 1991 constitution was amended to impose a limit of two five-year consecutive terms on the presidency. However, in 2010, Compaoré's supporters argued that because he was in office when the amendments went into effect, they did not apply to him and, hence, he was qualified to run for re-election a third time. He did—and captured 80 percent of the vote. In the run-up to the November 2015 elections, Compaoré's supporters, especially members of his party, the *Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès* (CDP), campaigned to change the constitution so that Compaoré could run for a fourth term.

Just before and in response to the scheduled vote on the controversial amendment, on October 28, 2014, thousands of protesters gathered in Ouagadougou, the capital, and Bobo Dioulasso, the country's second-biggest city. In response to the mass demonstrations, legislators postponed and eventually cancelled the vote. Just a few days later, Compaoré, who had ruled Burkina Faso since 1987, resigned and fled.

Also, over the years, both Compaoré and Burkina Faso became important players in the political economy of both the Sahel and the Sahara, especially in the fight against transnational terrorism. As 2015 neared, there was fear that if the president forced a change in the constitution and extended his stay in power, there could arise the type of political instability that might force military intervention. Even if the president left office as mandated by the constitution, there was still fear that he might try to hand over power to his powerful friends and family members, especially his brother, François Compaoré. In fact, many observers were convinced that any attempts by the president to either manipulate the 2015 elections to keep either the CDP and himself in power or to elevate his brother to the position, would most likely not be received well by an increasingly restless and inquisitive opposition. These fears, it turns out, were quite prophetic.

Immediately after the president resigned, army chief, General Honoré Traoré, Compaoré's aide de camp, announced to the nation that he had assumed the powers of president and head of state—a move not sanctioned by the constitution, which states that the president of the senate temporarily assumes those duties in a case like this.

In any case, the opposition, which had contributed significantly to the ouster of the president, rejected Traoré, arguing that as a close and trusted advisor of the ousted president, his leadership would not represent the type of complete break that they wanted with the painful past, as embodied in Compaoré's 27 years in power.

So, on November 1, 2014, Colonel Isaac Yacouba Zida, told the people of Burkina Faso that the military had intervened to prevent further violence and he had assumed the powers of the president and head of state. He went on to say that he would lead a "peaceful transition" and one that would guarantee the "continuity of the [Burkinabè] state." At the time, however, Zida did not provide any details about how he and the military planned to proceed with the transition. However, perhaps bowing to international pressure, Zida later stepped down in this role, with former diplomat and foreign minister Michel Kafando assuming power as the country's interim president. This move was largely seen as a positive development for democracy and civilian rule, though enthusiasm was quickly tempered when, days later, the military announced that Zida would serve as interim prime minister while the country prepared for elections.

Election 2015

So, what happens next? Over more than a quarter century in power, Compaoré used an

unusual formula to achieve relative stability in Burkina—authoritarianism mixed with traces of democracy. The complex governance system relied primarily on Compaoré's dominant and charismatic political power and failed to build sustainable institutions—specifically those capable of maintaining the rule of law and enhancing peaceful coexistence in his absence. He acted opportunistically and sought to exploit his public position for personal gain, endangering the country's democracy and paving the way for the military to intervene in national politics. Now, the foundations for democracy—especially political pluralism and stakeholder engagement—have eroded.

The Burkinabè military must unambiguously hand over power to a civilian government and fully retreat to the barracks, allowing a fully empowered civilian interim president to organize and carry out the 2015 elections.

In terms of the elections: Before Compaoré was forced out of office, he was expected to be one of the principal players in the presidential elections planned for 2015 (if he had succeeded in amending the constitution). Even before the opposition turned against Compaoré's candidacy, many important and close associates in the CDP, aware of maneuvers by Compaoré and his supporters to keep him in office indefinitely, had already left the party and joined the opposition—which is composed of several distinct opposition groups. And so, besides the formerly incumbent CDP, other major political parties in Burkina Faso include the Party for Democracy and Socialism (*Parti pour la démocratie et le socialisme*); and Union for Rebirth/Sankarist Movement (*Union pour la renaissance/Mouvement Sankariste*). As of December 2014, none of them has picked a candidate to lead them in the 2015 presidential election.

Sudan

Historical Context

From 1956 until 1989, the government in the Republic of Sudan was characterized by instability, violence and coups d'état. After a 1989 bloodless coup, Colonel Omar al-Bashir, supported by a military council, rose to power, suspended political parties, extended the Islamic legal code to the entire country, and suppressed and/or banned organizations that opposed his regime. In 1993, al-Bashir declared himself president and dissolved the military council.

As a pro-democracy movement swept the continent in the early 1990s, Sudan also attempted to engage in “democratic” elections, holding presidential and legislative elections in 1996. The attempt did not go well. There were no legal political parties so candidates ran as independents. As a result of the civil war that was raging throughout most of the southern provinces, voting did not take place in that part of the country. The opposition called for a boycott, arguing that the process was unfair to them, especially given the fact that government organs (including public media houses) favored al-Bashir and made it very difficult for opposition candidates to effectively and fully inform the voters of their political positions. In the end, Omar al-Bashir captured 75 percent of the votes cast, while the 39 other candidates collectively received 22 percent.

Al-Bashir's regime has been characterized by significantly high levels of internal violence. In fact, in July 2008, the International Criminal Court called for the arrest of al-Bashir for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. However, over the last 10 years, the violence within Sudan's borders has fallen



significantly, primarily as a result of the independence of South Sudan in 2011; reconciliation with the exiled opposition group the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), allowing it to participate in governance; and a peace agreement with the main rebel group in Darfur (though fighting has not ceased since some rebels have rejected it).

In 2010, Sudan held both presidential and legislative elections. Al-Bashir captured 68 percent of the vote. However, both domestic and international observers argued that the election was neither free, nor fair nor credible, citing intimidation and harassment of the opposition, corruption, fraud, and interference with the campaigns of opposition politicians (Carter Center 2010).

Election 2015

The elections in 2015 could be a major turning point for Sudan: In October 2013, various members of al-Bashir's ruling National Congress Party (NCP), dissatisfied with the president's leadership, announced plans to form a new party, one that is expected to appeal to secularists and leftists. This move, should it take place, would represent the most important challenge to party cohesion since the decision by Hassan al-Turabi to leave the NCP and form the opposition NDA. However, senior members of the government do not believe that there would be such a split. They have strongly criticized these suggestions, especially those that would weaken the NCP and threaten its hegemonic control of the country.

Regarding the 2015 elections, tentatively scheduled for April 2, 2015, senior government officials have accused the opposition of refusing to engage in a national dialogue, one which would include all of the country's political constituencies in examining (1) ending civil conflict; (2) dealing more effectively with poverty; (3) strengthening national identity; and (4) improving political freedoms. The important

political alliance called the National Consensus Forces (NCF) has boycotted these supposed efforts, arguing that the government is acting opportunistically, is only seeking to maximize al-Bashir's chances of remaining president, and is not interested in genuine dialogue.

So, who is likely to participate in the 2015 elections? First, al-Bashir (who has been in office since 1989) and the ruling NCP will run and—should they win—will continue the same failed policies that have alienated Sudan from the international community, severely limited foreign investment, significantly increased bureaucratic and political impunity, and retarded the country's transition to democratic governance and integrated development. Second, Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi of the National Umma Party (NUP), the country's largest opposition, will likely run. Like other opposition leaders, he favors the formation of a transitional government, which would provide the wherewithal for the holding of a national sovereign conference whose participation would include all the country's relevant

stakeholder groups, including rebel groups, to seek out a solution to intractable problems, particularly the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states. Finally, there are other opposition parties, including those belonging to rebel groups, such as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), which argue that the elections should be postponed until comprehensive peace has been achieved in the country. They maintain that, under existing conditions, free, fair and credible elections are not likely to happen, and that al-Bashir and the NCP will manipulate the process to ensure they are victorious.

While a free and fair election in 2015 could create the opportunity to engage the peoples of Sudan in the type of state reconstruction and reconstitution that they failed to undertake at independence in 1956, given the current regional violence and the absence of governmental openness and transparency, it is unlikely that the elections will be fully participatory and inclusive, nor would they be fair and free. Hence, the results are likely to confirm the status quo.

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